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CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE EAST INDIAN SEAS:  
PROPERTY, SOVEREIGNTY, COMMERCE 
AND WAR IN HUGO GROTIUS’ DE IURE 
PRAEDAE—THE LAW OF PRIZE AND 
BOOTY, OR “ON HOW TO DISTINGUISH  
MERCHANTS FROM PIRATES” 
Ileana M. Porras* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
hroughout history, and across the globe, peoples and nations have 
encountered and entered into relationship with one another.  While 
keeping in mind the dangers of oversimplification, it could nevertheless 
be argued that despite their variety, international relations fall mostly 
into either of two familiar types: The first takes the form of war or con-
quest, while the second pertains to commerce or international trade.1 It is 
evident that these two categories are not mutually exclusive; war and 
trade have often gone hand in hand. War has more often than not served 
the needs of commerce, while commerce has fueled the capacity for war. 
Nevertheless, war and trade have traditionally been treated as distinct 
and even antithetical realms of international relations. War, typically as-
sociated with state-on-state violence, destruction and subjugation, is un-
derstood  as  international  relations  pursued  by  public  authorities un-
der the register of coercion—war is antagonistic and creates enmity. 
Trade, on the other hand, imagined as involving private commercial 
transactions and associated with reciprocity and mutual advantage, is 
                                                                                                             
 *  Visiting Professor, Arizona State University College of Law. I would like to thank 
the organizers and participants of the War and Trade Symposium for a rich and enjoyable 
experience. The work and friendship of many of the participants have over the years 
served as a great inspiration and support. I would also like to thank the remarkable group 
of Grotius scholars who welcomed me in their midst and, in the course of the workshop 
on Piracy, Property, Punishment—Hugo Grotius and De Iure Praedae, held at the Neth-
erlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in June 2005, introduced me to a new mul-
tidisciplinary Grotius. Special thanks, however, go to Dan Danielsen for his careful and 
generous reading of an early draft of this article, but above all for his unflagging encour-
agement and friendship on the journey. 
 1. Another form of international relations that intersects with the first two in a num-
ber of complicated ways and is perhaps equally pervasive is that of religious or spiritual 
propagation. The exploration of this third leg of the international relations stool however, 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
T 
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understood as international relations pursued by private actors under the 
register of consent—trade is friendly and produces amity. 
Recent scholarship has raised serious challenges to each of these cate-
gories, terms and associations, yet our modern legal and international 
relations regimes still reflect a fundamental division between war (public 
and coercive) and trade (private and consensual). Because war has come 
to be considered an evil that interferes with human flourishing, the offi-
cial project of public international law has been to limit and constrain 
war, if not to prohibit it altogether. The project of international trade law, 
on the other hand, has been to encourage and facilitate international 
commercial transactions on the assumption that international trade is 
consensual and welfare enhancing. One striking outcome of the contrast 
so readily drawn between war and trade is that today it is proclaimed that 
an end to the scourge of war and global insecurity will arrive in the wake 
of a commitment to worldwide trade liberalization. 
This article sets out to challenge some of the tradition’s conventional 
assumptions about the distinct roles of war and trade in the history of 
international law. Through a reading of an early seventeenth century text, 
De Iure Praedae (The Law of Prize and Booty)2 written by a young 
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) sometime between 1604 and 1608,3 I explore 
the surprisingly crucial role played by concepts and views of commerce 
and commercial competition at the origins of international law, including 
the law of war. It is in this early work, a text whose professed intent was 
to justify the seizure and prize-taking of a Portuguese merchant vessel by 
a corporate-owned Dutch merchant vessel in the East Indies, that 
Grotius, still revered by many as the father of international law,4 first 
                                                                                                             
 2. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS [COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
OF PRIZE AND BOOTY] (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Clarendon Press 
1950) (1604), in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed., 1950). 
This Carnegie translation is being reissued by the Liberty Press as HUGO GROTIUS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (Martine Julia van Ittersum ed., Liberty 
Fund, forthcoming May 2006), in NATURAL LAW AND ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS (Knud 
Haakonssen ed., 2006). 
 3. For a brief biography of Hugo Grotius, see C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the De-
velopment of International Relations Theory:“The Long Seventeenth Century” and the 
Elaboration of a European States System, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 35 (1997). 
 4. Recent scholarship has challenged the characterization of Hugo Grotius as the 
father of modern international law. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholar-
ship, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 76–95 (1986). See also PETER HAGGENMACHER, GROTIUS ET 
LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE JUSTE [GROTIUS AND THE DOCTRINE OF JUST WAR] (1983); 
Benedict Kingsbury, A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius, Law, and 
Moral Skepticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 3, 8–14 (1997). 
See also JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934) (dis-
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elaborated a comprehensive theory of justice, a doctrine of the freedom 
of the seas, and a law of war. While his thoughts on the subject of the 
rights of war and peace in particular continued to evolve throughout his 
career, their fundamental character was formed in De Iure Praedae, in 
the context of what we might call a commercial dispute between Europe-
ans in the East Indies. 
European ideas about the law of nations and the law of war had, until 
the sixteenth century, been used primarily to address questions of diplo-
macy and war arising within a familiar European context. The doctrines 
of just war were useful for regulating or prohibiting armed conflict 
among Christian sovereigns in Europe (wars framed as dynastic disputes 
or arising out of sovereign ambition for territory) and to justify war 
against pagans and heathens on the borders of Europe (wars waged in 
defense of Christianity or her holy places). The European period of “dis-
covery” and the encounter with the unknown peoples of the New World 
broke the familiar frame and required a re-tooling of European doctrines 
to address the new exigencies generated by the unprecedented European 
conquest. In his magisterial work on the colonial origin of international 
law, Antony Anghie argued that many of the basic doctrines of interna-
tional law “were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that 
could account for relations between the European and non-European 
worlds in the colonial confrontation.”5 According to Anghie, the set of 
structures created by international law out of the moment of New World-
European encounter, structures that he convincingly demonstrates are 
repeated throughout the history of modern international law, constructed 
the “difference” of the native subject in such a way as to disable him vis-
à-vis normal international law, even as it turned him into a prime object 
of concern and reform. By the sixteenth century then, the Christian 
European law of nations and the law of war had begun its radical trans-
formation into a secular (or natural) and universally applicable interna-
tional law. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a new and violent encoun-
ter took place in the East Indies, one which further challenged the as-
sumptions of international law. As European nations other than Spain 
and Portugal, the powers which for over a century had dominated the 
seas, began to build and expand their maritime capacity, their merchants 
turned their sights on promising new commercial ventures in the East 
                                                                                                             
cussing the proposition that the Spanish jurists rather than Grotius should be considered 
the founders of international law). 
 5. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 3 (2005). 
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Indies. In the face of Iberian claims of exclusivity in the Indies trade, the 
merchants of Protestant Britain and those of the United Provinces6 (also 
known as the Dutch) pooled their resources, investing their capital in 
corporations chartered to undertake trading missions to the Indies. The 
stage was set for the encounter of European traders with one another in 
the distant seas of the Indies, and it proved a violent affair. Fueled by an 
endemic state of war in Europe, the conflictual predisposition of the 
European vessels’ commanders, crew and traders, was in the Indies ap-
parently exacerbated by commercial competition. 
Building on the work of Antony Anghie, I would like to propose that 
the violent encounter of Europeans with one another over competition for 
trade in the Indies was as generative of international law as the direct 
encounter of Europe with Native America. This article does not seek to 
contest Anghie’s important and original insight concerning the founda-
tional role of the colonial encounter for international law. Rather, by 
turning to the theater of the East Indies in the early seventeenth century 
instead of that of the New World in the sixteenth century, it seeks to 
complicate the story in two significant respects: by noticing the triangu-
lated character of the colonial encounter and, in tandem, by stressing the 
vital role played by commercial competition in that encounter. 
A. Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae and its Seventeenth Century Context 
Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae is a lengthy and complex work which 
was never published in his lifetime.7 Indeed, it lay all but forgotten until 
the 1860’s when a manuscript of the text in Grotius’ handwriting was 
                                                                                                             
 6. In this article the term “United Provinces” has been retained to designate the en-
tity that is sometimes referred to as the “United Provinces of the Netherlands” or the 
“United Netherlands.” This entity is sometimes in the literature somewhat misleadingly 
referred to as the “Dutch Republic.” In the early years of the seventeenth century, how-
ever, the United Provinces had not yet achieved uncontested recognition as an independ-
ent nation or state, nor had its leaders unambiguously settled on the political form of a 
republic. Full recognition as an independent republic was achieved only in 1648 when the 
Dutch Republic signed a comprehensive peace treaty with Spain, one of the agreements 
that came to be known as the Peace of Westphalia. 
 7. Structurally, the work is comprised of fifteen chapters that can be broken down 
into five distinct sections: (1) The introduction and Prolegomena, in which Grotius sets 
forth a comprehensive theory of justice (chapters I & II); (2) A theoretical analysis of just 
war (chapters III–X); (3) An historical account of the events (the facts) that led to the 
taking of the Santa Catarina (chapter XI); (4) An application of the law of war to the 
facts, first as a case of just private war (chapter XII) and then as a case of just public war 
(chapter XIII); and (5) A discussion of whether the taking of the Santa Catarina was 
honorable and beneficial in addition to being legitimate (chapters XIV & XV). 
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discovered.8 In this extensive tract, part history, part politico-
philosophical dissertation, part advocacy brief, Grotius vigorously sought 
to demonstrate the unimpeachable legitimacy of an act of violent acquisi-
tion in the East Indies. At stake were not native lands taken by Europe-
ans, but a richly laden Portuguese-flagged carrack, the Santa Catarina, 
captured off the coast of Sumatra by a fleet of merchant vessels belong-
ing to the recently chartered Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1603.9 
The legal question addressed by Grotius in De Iure Praedae was whether 
under the particular facts of the case, the taking of the Santa Catarina, 
could legitimately be considered a “seizure of prize,” “the acquisition of 
enemy property through war.”10 
The immediate economic stakes were fabulous. The Santa Catarina, a 
fourteen hundred ton carrack, which at the time of its capture had been 
porting from the Portuguese settlement at Macao in China to Goa in In-
dia, held merchandise that when sold at public auction yielded about 
three and a half million florins.11 The legal and moral stakes were equally 
                                                                                                             
 8. The text, which bears no title in the manuscript, was named De Iure Praedae 
Commentarius [Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty] by its first editor. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that in his correspondence, Grotius always referred to this early 
work as De rebus Indicis [On Indian Matters], which tends to hint at its close connection 
to Francisco de Vitoria’s earlier work De Indis Noviter Inventis [On the Indians Lately 
Discovered], commonly referred to as De Indis. FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE 
IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., William S. Hein & 
Co. 1995) (1557), in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed., 
1995). The edition relied upon spells the author’s last name as “Victoria,” however, be-
cause he is commonly referred to as “Vitoria,” all citations will be to Vitoria. 
 9. The Dutch East India Company, known by its Dutch acronym “VOC,” was incor-
porated on March 20, 1602 by the States-General of the United Provinces. The Ver-
eenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie was created by the union of six small companies, usu-
ally referred to as the pre-companies. Between them, these pre-companies—of which the 
Amsterdam and Zeeland-based companies were by far the most significant—had com-
missioned a total of sixty-five merchant vessels to sail to the East Indies between 1595 
and 1602. For a concise summary of the history of the foundation and complex structure 
of the VOC, see F.S. Gaastra, Foundation of the VOC—The Charter, http://www.tanap. 
net/content/voc/organization/organization_found.htm. The fleet involved in the taking of 
the Santa Catarina was owned and managed by the Amsterdam-based pre-company, the 
Gede Amsterdamse Oostindische Compagnie when it set sail from the United Provinces. 
By the time of the capture, however, which took place on February 25, 1603, the Gede 
Amsterdamse Oostindische Compagnie had been subsumed under the VOC. Id. 
 10. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 30. 
 11. “At the time, this was equivalent to one half of the paid-in capital of the Nether-
lands’ United East India Company (VOC), established in 1602, and more than double 
that of its English counterpart, the Honorable East India Company (EIC), founded in 
1600.” Peter Borschberg, The Santa Catarina Incident of 1603: Dutch Freebooting, the 
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high. In theory, either the Santa Catarina was a lawfully and, as Grotius 
would argue, a gloriously taken “prize,” and the vessel and her goods 
could be kept, or Jacob van Heemskerck, commander of the Dutch mer-
chant fleet, had perpetrated an ignominious act of “piracy,” and the ves-
sel and her goods would have to be returned to their legitimate owners. 
There is good evidence that Grotius was commissioned to prepare a de-
fense of the taking by some of the directors of the VOC, but no evidence 
that Grotius’ unpublished text was ever put to practical use in the legal 
dispute. Indeed, by the time Grotius completed work on De Iure Prae-
dae, the Santa Catarina had been duly confiscated, and the prize adjudi-
cated by the Admiralty Board of Amsterdam.12 The Board’s predictable 
verdict in favor of Van Heemskerck and the VOC was based on a jumble 
of “loosely related arguments” in which self-defense, just war doctrine, 
natural law and the law of nations were all brought to bear. According to 
Van Ittersum, who has undertaken careful and detailed research of the 
documentary evidence available, Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae should 
be understood as a response to the Board’s written verdict, an attempt at 
putting some order into the unsatisfying tangle of legal principles.13 Ac-
cording to Van Ittersum, while the directors of the VOC may have turned 
to Grotius to produce a convincing historico-political tract denouncing 
Portuguese depredations in the East Indies, peppered liberally with ges-
tures to familiar and high-sounding legal doctrines and unimpeachable 
principles, they were not commissioning a work of legal theory.14 What 
they sought was a work of apologia or propaganda. What Grotius pro-
duced was rather more complex and multifaceted. Justification of the 
taking of the Santa Catarina remained the work’s central concern and 
functioned as an organizing principle. It could also be argued, however, 
that the events surrounding the seizure and the legal, political, economic, 
and moral questions it gave rise to, served as a vehicle for Grotius to 
study and then expand upon recent scholarship on sovereignty and just 
war theory, to reflect on the subject of property and natural rights, and to 
develop some original ideas concerning the role of commerce in interna-
                                                                                                             
Portuguese Estado da Índia and Intra-Asian Trade at the Dawn of the 17th Century, 11 
REV. OF CULTURE 13, 13 (2004). 
 12. Martine Julia van Ittersum, Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck’s Capture 
of the Santa Catarina and its Justification in De Iure Praedae (1604–1606), 31 ASIAN J. 
SOC. SCI. 511, 521 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 524. 
 14. Id. at 525–26. Though a fairly young man at the time, Grotius, a protégée of the 
powerful Pensionary Oldenbarnevelt, had been appointed Historiographer of Holland in 
1601, a post he held until 1604. In 1607, his political career was significantly advanced 
when he was promoted to Advocaat Fiscaal. Roelofsen, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
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tional relations. The result of Grotius’ application to the subject yielded a 
rich intellectual harvest: De Iure Praedae is the original context of De 
Mare Liberum, the important Grotian tract on the freedom of the seas, 
published anonymously in 1609,15 and it contains the prototype of the 
most important Grotian contribution to international law, the influential 
de Iure Belli ac Pacis, first published in 1625.16 
Any foray into the reading of a seventeenth century text such as De 
Iure Praedae is fraught with peril. It is not just a matter of the ever-
present danger of falling into anachronism. The past is indeed a foreign 
country and we do not speak the language. It is thus almost impossible to 
read a seventeenth century text in its own terms. We can only guess at 
the motivations of the actors, and at the association of ideas which col-
ored their understanding of what they were “up to.”17 Over three hundred 
years separate us from these precursors; three centuries over the course 
of which the nature and practice of commerce and war have changed 
dramatically, while the international law that under-girds them has gone 
through many currents and countless iterations. Yet our tendency is to 
read the past as somehow coherent in itself and congruent with the pre-
sent. Thus, it is almost impossible not to look back into history without 
having the past be colored by the prism of the as yet undetermined fu-
ture. Inescapably, given the future role of the Dutch (and the British) as 
colonial powers in the East Indies, and the part played in this develop-
ment by the rival East India Companies, it is difficult not to read the 
story of De Iure Praedae as deeply implicated in the story of empire and 
colonialism. And, since imperial ideologies are discredited in the minds 
of most modern readers, we are equally tempted to impute disingenuous-
                                                                                                             
 15. The Freedom of the Seas (a.k.a. The Free Sea) is in substantial part a reworking 
of chapter XII of De Iure Praedae. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 216–82. Its publication in 
Leiden in 1609 coincided with Spanish-Dutch truce negotiations. All references to the 
particular case of the taking of the Santa Catarina were eliminated and the tract focused 
more generally on the legal basis for the Dutch claim to a general right of access to the 
seas. Beginning in 1610 Anglo-Dutch disputes over fisheries erupted and a number of 
British scholars attacked Mare Liberum, having concluded that its real purpose was to 
open up British coastal waters to Dutch fishing. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE 
SEAS, OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN 
TRADE (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608), avail-
able at http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Grotius0110/FreedomOfSeas/HTMLs/0049_Pt03_ 
English.html. 
 16. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE 
AND OF NATIONS (A.C. Campbell trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901) (1625), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Grotius0110/LawOfWarPeace/0138_Bk.html. 
 17. See generally 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (1978). 
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ness and devious purpose to those who in any way participated in or con-
tributed to the production of the colonial enterprise. We can resist this 
temptation to some extent, but are always at risk of faltering back into 
the fallacy of retrojection because of the demands of a coherent narrative 
arc. The challenge is made all the more difficult when, as in this case, the 
seventeenth century author has come to hold a prominent place in the 
canon and is considered by many a significant contributor in the history 
of ideas of multiple modern academic fields.18 
The past may be a foreign country. Yet, for all that, we are entangled 
with it in a complex and often obscure web. For better or worse, we can-
not escape it. Despite the inevitable pitfalls and our own limitations, we 
strive to make sense of the present through a past that is inherently 
opaque. While we cannot hope to render the past transparent or fully in-
telligible nor, for that matter, completely avoid making anachronistic or 
culturally incoherent associations, we can at least attempt to avoid some 
of the most palpable incongruities. A brief sketch of the historical con-
text19 within which Grotius prepared his tract justifying the taking of the 
Santa Catarina will, despite being inevitably partial and contestable, 
serve to sharpen our understanding of the multiplicity of thorny issues 
that Grotius had to address in his text and help us to identify his unique 
contribution. 
B. The Context of the United Provinces 
At the turn of the seventeenth century, despite being embroiled in con-
tinuous conflict and war against Spain, the United Provinces had already 
entered a period of economic expansion and cultural and social renewal 
that has come to be known as the Dutch Golden Age.20 Though it would 
take almost another half century for the newly forged union to be for-
mally recognized as independent by its erstwhile sovereign, the King of 
Spain, it was a prosperous time.21 The traditional maritime trades were 
                                                                                                             
 18. Grotius was actively involved in the religious, political and philosophical contro-
versies of his age. He was a renowned and prolific author. In today’s overly segmented 
disciplinary terms, we could say that his main contributions were in the fields of theology 
and Christian apologetics, legal and political theory, philosophy, international relations, 
and history. See Roelofsen, supra note 3, at 44. 
 19. For a much richer description of some of this historical context, see JONATHAN 
ISRAEL, DUTCH PRIMACY IN WORLD TRADE, 1585–1740 (1989). 
 20. See generally SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTER-
PRETATION OF DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE (1987). 
 21. The Dutch rebellion may be said to have begun around 1568. Philip II, King of 
Spain and sovereign over an impressive number of nations, cities, principalities and other 
territories dispersed over all four known continents, was officially deposed as Count of 
Holland by the promulgation of the Act of Deposition on July 26, 1581, an act whereby 
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flourishing, as was the shipbuilding industry. The war with Spain had 
brought political and religious refugees from the southern provinces of 
the Low Countries22 still under Habsburg rule, and the émigrés brought 
with them commercial and technological know-how, already established 
pan-European trading networks, as well as large quantities of capital now 
seeking investment opportunities.23 
Beginning in 1595, enterprising Dutch merchants had sent vessels to 
explore new commercial opportunities in what was considered to be one 
of the most potentially profitable trades of the time: the spice trade from 
the East Indies, a trade until then monopolized almost exclusively by the 
Portuguese who claimed and controlled the sea routes from Europe. 
Though Grotius in De Iure Praedae intimates that the Dutch were driven 
to make this incursion into waters claimed by the Portuguese because of 
“necessity,”24 it seems fairly clear that the ventures were prompted first 
and foremost by the fortuitous 1595 publication of Jan Huygen van Lin-
schoten’s Reysgheschrift, which made the zealously guarded navigational 
instructions of the Portuguese to the East Indies finally available.25 King 
Philip II of Spain’s ill-considered decision to cut off his rebellious Dutch 
subjects from their profitable role as Europe’s middlemen for the Iberian 
trade served to justify the Dutch ventures,26 while the relative calm in the 
Spanish-Dutch conflict following the king’s death in 1598, further en-
                                                                                                             
the States-General of the United Provinces sought to declare “independence” and transfer 
sovereignty to the Duke of Anjou. It was only in 1648, however, eighty years after the 
beginning of the conflict that Philip IV formally recognized Dutch independence. For a 
concise account of the Dutch rebellion and its causes, see Roelofsen, supra note 3, at 40–
43. For a more detailed account of the Dutch revolt, see JONATHAN ISRAEL, THE DUTCH 
REPUBLIC: ITS RISE, GREATNESS, AND FALL, 1477–1806 (R.J.W. Evans ed., 1995). 
 22. The southern provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, also known as the Southern 
Netherlands, eventually gained independence in 1831 and is today known as Belgium. 
 23. BENJAMIN SCHMIDT, INNOCENCE ABROAD: THE DUTCH IMAGINATION AND THE NEW 
WORLD, 1570–1670, at 140–42 (1st paperback ed. 2006). Émigrés from the south, for 
instance, provided 40 percent of the VOC’s start-up capital. Id. at 140. For an in-depth 
account of the transformation of the Dutch economy in this period, see JAN DE VRIES & 
ADRIAAN VAN DER WOUDE, THE FIRST MODERN ECONOMY: SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND 
PERSEVERANCE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY, 1500–1815 (1997). 
 24. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 178. 
 25. SCHMIDT, supra note 23, at 153–54. According to Schmidt, the publication of the 
Reysgheschrift in 1595 and of the accompanying Itinerario in 1596, instantly launched 
Dutch trade to the East. Indeed the first major Dutch fleet to set sail to the Indies under 
Cornelis de Houtman in 1595 is said to have carried a copy of the Reysgheschrift on 
board. Id. at 154. 
 26. Halfway between the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic region, and a natural en-
tryway into northern and central Europe, during the sixteenth century the ports of the 
Low Countries had become major warehousing and distribution centers for Portuguese 
spices and Baltic grain. See DE VRIES & VAN DER WOUDE, supra note 23, at 356. 
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couraged Dutch boldness.27 The initial forays to the East Indies by Dutch 
merchants were profitable enough to inspire further ventures and, by 
1601, the English had followed the Dutch example.28 
Already by the time Admiral Van Heemskerck’s fleet, which was to 
take the Santa Catarina, left Holland in April 1601, the Dutch had sent at 
least sixty-five merchant ships to the East Indies and established a series 
of “factories,” including one at the Japanese port of Bantam. This Dutch 
toe-hold in the vicinity of the Spice Islands may well have caused serious 
concern among the Portuguese, who considered the East Indies-European 
trade as their exclusive domain, but the establishment of a factory in the 
East Indies should not be confused for an attempt at establishing a set-
tlement, much less a colony. “Factories” were pragmatic responses to the 
price inflation that inevitably attended the sudden arrival of large Euro-
pean vessels in search of East Indian trading goods. A kind of guarded 
warehouse, the factory served primarily to stockpile wares. In theory, 
East Indian products could be acquired by company factors when prices 
were favorably low, while European trade goods could be disposed of 
over a longer period of time, thus avoiding a market glut. 
It is important to remember that in the early seventeenth century com-
mercial exchange with Europeans constituted no more than a small pro-
portion of the overall commercial activity in the East Indies. The bulk of 
commercial exchange in Asia was regional. The great domestic markets 
of China, India and Java were served by Chinese, Japanese, Arab, Malay 
and other local merchant vessels.29 Furthermore, while it is not impossi-
                                                                                                             
 27. In the historical narrative, Grotius describes the Dutch decision to brave the perils 
of the East Indies as a direct result of having been cut off from the intermediary role: 
After that period, indeed, when it became apparent that the enemy had entered 
upon a systematic attempt to subjugate through hunger and want the nation 
which it had been unable to subjugate by armed force—that is to say, when the 
Iberian trade that had hitherto constituted our people’s principal means of sub-
sistence was cut off—we ourselves gradually began to turn our attention to 
lengthy voyages, and to distant nations which were known to the Portuguese 
but not subject to them. 
1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 178. 
 28. The British East India Company (EIC) chartered in 1600 sent its first small fleet 
to the East Indies in February 1601. 
 29. Recent research suggests “that until 1800 an integrated world economy was 
dominated by India and China.” Robert Markley, Riches, Power, Trade and Religion: 
The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1720, 17 RENAISSANCE STUD. 494, 494 
(2003). The need to reassess the Eurocentric assumptions of early modern history has 
also been stressed by Linda Colley, who provides a lively and sobering reminder of the 
distance between the rhetoric and the reality of Britain’s early claims to rule the waves. 
LINDA COLLEY, CAPTIVES: BRITAIN, EMPIRE, AND THE WORLD, 1600–1850 (2002). 
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ble that some Dutch merchants and other adventurers were interested in 
the possibility of overseas territorial acquisition, there was little sense 
that large scale colonization was either feasible or desirable.30 Unlike 
New World natives, the peoples of the East Indies could not easily be 
dismissed as naked, uncivilized savages with no sense of property rela-
tions. On the contrary, Europeans were impressed by what they saw of 
the Chinese and Japanese civilizations, and by the manners, rituals and 
obvious wealth of the multitude of Muslim princelings that they encoun-
tered on their commercial adventures. Furthermore, while the image of 
limitless riches “there for the taking” still beckoned, by the early seven-
teenth century it was becoming evident to the Dutch that the Spanish 
(and to a lesser extent the Portuguese) territorial conquest of the New 
World was not the unequivocal glorious or profitable enterprise that it 
had seemed to be at first blush. While the gold and silver extracted from 
the mines seemed inexhaustible, the prohibitive cost of maintaining mili-
tary and administrative control over the source of these riches was be-
ginning to show. A common assessment was that the Iberians’ New 
World conquests had led to tyranny abroad and had brought depopulation 
and impoverishment at home.31 For those investing their capital in the 
inherently risky long distance East Indies trade, the goal was to secure 
maximum profits and a quick return. Sinking capital into colonies, set-
tlements and fortresses was not part of the plan. Even the building and 
maintaining of fortifications to protect the factories were viewed as un-
fortunate if unavoidable expenditures.32 Within a remarkably short time, 
                                                                                                             
 30. It is perhaps worth noting that at the turn of the seventeenth century, neither the 
Dutch nor the English had any experience in overseas settlement or colonization. While 
the Spanish and Portuguese had extended their rule over lands in the Caribbean, Central 
and South America and obtained some territorial concessions in Asia, European presence 
in North America had only barely begun. The earliest British settlement attempt at Roa-
noke (1584–1590), Sir Walter Raleigh’s plantation, had been abandoned; whereas the 
first hundred settlers destined for its successor, the Virginia settlement, did not arrive in 
North America until April 1607. The Pilgrims (or Leiden Separatists), for their part, made 
landfall in Massachusetts only in 1620, while the Dutch settlement of New Amsterdam 
(later New York) was not undertaken until 1625. 
 31. See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 166–67 
(2000); ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, 
BRITAIN AND FRANCE C. 1500–C. 1800, at 66–73 (1995). 
 32. When after many years of promotion by interested parties the Dutch West Indies 
Company (WIC) was finally chartered in 1621, it failed at first to generate the necessary 
capital investment. Investors, it appears, were suspicious of the overt double purpose of 
the WIC. The terms of the charter foresaw that the WIC would be involved not only in 
trade as such, but in the settlement of colonies, while taking an active military role 
against Spanish interests in the West Indies. See Charter of the Dutch West India Com-
pany: 1621, June 3, 1621, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westind.htm. 
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the picture would take on different character, one in which the Dutch by 
force of arms subjugated and seized control of the spice islands, brutal-
ized the local populations and dealt ruthlessly with European competi-
tors. Even then, however, the VOC was not wholeheartedly committed to 
a project of settlement or colonization and, consequently, the sharehold-
ers and many of its directors resisted and protested territorial expansion 
and its attendant costs. 
When Van Heemskerck’s small fleet set sail for the East Indies in 
1601, there is no question that it was engaged upon a commercial, rather 
than a colonial or military, adventure. Like all merchant vessels engaged 
in the long distance seaborne trade, however, it was armed. At a time 
when armed conflict in Europe was a constant, it could not have been 
otherwise. The Spaniards, with whom the Dutch had by 1601 been at war 
for about forty years, had a massive naval presence and economic inter-
ests to defend around the world. Furthermore, they controlled the adja-
cent ports of the southern provinces of the Spanish Netherlands.33 Skir-
mishes were common. Keeping their major ports open and Dutch ship-
ping safe were significant concerns of the two great Dutch maritime 
provinces, Holland and Zeeland, whose economies were largely depend-
ent on the fishing industry and seaborne trade. Furthermore, journeys to 
the East Indies were long (a return trip averaging twenty-two months) 
and the vessels faced many perils along the route, both natural and hu-
man. Pirates and hostile local populations were ever-present dangers, but 
of equal concern was that of running into a Portuguese vessel, as it was 
assumed that they would greet Dutch vessels trespassing on their turf 
with certain violence. All Dutch merchant vessels were therefore armed 
and ready for self-defense. But Dutch merchant vessels, like the English 
East India Company ships that followed their lead into the East Indies 
seas, were also primed for privateering. 
Indeed, by the turn of the century Dutch merchantmen already had a 
long experience of privateering. The so-called Dutch “Sea Beggars,” a 
fleet of privateers commissioned by William, Prince of Orange, had 
played a key role in the beginning of the Dutch rebellion (and had subse-
quently been transformed into the first Dutch navy), while Zeeland-based 
privateers continued to choke off all commerce with the port of Antwerp, 
occupied by Spain in 1585.34 Privateers functioned as a kind of merce-
                                                                                                             
 33. Defeated by the English (and the weather) in 1588, the Spanish Armada had rap-
idly been rebuilt and improved. 
 34. Oscar Gelderblom, The Political Economy of Foreign Trade in England and the 
Dutch Republic (1550–1650), at 5 (June 2004) (unpublished working paper, available at 
http://www.lowcountries.nl/2004-8_gelderblom.pdf). 
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nary navy at a time when war ships were few and far between.35 During 
times of war, a sovereign could commission a private vessel by means of 
an official document known as a Letter of Marque. The private vessel 
would thereby receive official sanction to arm herself and harass or at-
tack enemy shipping. It was a lucrative trade and privateering commis-
sions could often be sold by the sovereign. Ships taken by privateers, like 
enemy ships taken by war ships, would be considered “prize” to be adju-
dicated by the relevant admiralty court. Once adjudicated, the “prize” 
would be sold at auction and the profits distributed to the prize taker, her 
crew and the government in accordance with some predetermined ar-
rangement. 
In theory, privateering was an officially regulated activity, but as the 
events surrounding the taking of the Santa Catarina (and other Portu-
guese vessels) would show, commanders of merchant vessels were ready 
and willing to take matters into their own hands. The temptation to short-
cut the long, economically uncertain trading missions by seizing and ap-
propriating the cargo of well-laden Portuguese vessels was almost irre-
sistible. Taking of prize was attractive to the commander and crew of a 
vessel because in addition to their formal share of the prize, it was a 
source of unofficial private booty. Equally important, the captured vessel 
and its cargo, once officially confiscated and adjudicated by an admiralty 
court, constituted a substantial windfall for the directors and shareholders 
of the VOC, as well as for the relevant ruling elite. Not surprisingly per-
haps, plunder, along with more traditional commercial exchange and 
war, became one head of the “incontestable and indivisible trinity upon 
which the company built a good chunk of its early fortunes.”36 However 
profitable (and relatively effortless), privateering was nevertheless mor-
ally and politically risky. Only a fine line served to distinguish the 
unlawful (and much condemned) piratical seizure of merchant vessels 
                                                                                                             
 35. Privateering was until well into the nineteenth century an accepted practice. The 
United States Constitution, for example, specifically authorizes Congress to issue Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Privateers played a significant role on all 
sides of the U.S. War of Independence and the follow-up Anglo-American War of 1812. 
Officially sanctioned privateering was mostly outlawed by the Declaration of Paris of 
1856, which prohibited the issuance of Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Declaration of 
Paris, April 16, 1856, available at http://elsinore.cis.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/ 
decparis.htm. The United States, however, was not a signatory. 
 36. Peter Borschberg, Luso-Johor-Dutch Relations in the Straits of Malacca and Sin-
gapore, c. 1600–1623, 28 ITINERARIO 15, 21 (2004). What was true of the VOC would 
also be true of the EIC. Indeed, absent James Lancaster’s enthusiastic involvement in 
privateering, it is unlikely that the first venture of the EIC in 1601 would have broken 
even financially, much less proven a success. See JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE 
COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY 14–18 (1991). 
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from the capture of prize by privateers. Indeed, from the point of view of 
the seized vessel, her crew and the owners of the cargo, the two events 
were nearly indistinguishable.37 
It was in this context that Grotius prepared his defense of the taking of 
the Santa Catarina. Many factors made the case a difficult one to argue: 
Commander Van Heemskerck, in charge of a private merchant fleet, did 
not carry a written sovereign commission in the form of a Letter of Mar-
que which would have given him official sanction to engage in an offen-
sive war against “enemy” shipping. The taking of the Santa Catarina had 
been effected at a distance and in a world far removed from any Euro-
pean theatre of war. While the Dutch fleet might have been able to rely 
on a claim of self-defense, the Portuguese merchant vessel was not 
known to have initiated an attack, but instead Van Heemskerck had lain 
in wait for her. The case for a standing Portuguese “enmity” against the 
Dutch was weak as what enmity existed was merely the result of a forced 
union under the King of Spain.38 Finally, even if Portugal was to be con-
sidered the enemy of the Dutch because of this union, there remained the 
problem of the status of the United Provinces: Were the Dutch true sov-
ereigns or were they merely rebels? 
It was Grotius’ genius to have taken these difficulties and resolved 
them in the original and multilayered De Iure Praedae, a work whose 
significance went well beyond the dispute in question. In his hands, the 
violent encounter of European merchants in the distant seas of the East 
Indies and the conundrums it posed served as a catalyst for a re-
interpretation of international law. To explore the impact this new intra-
European merchant encounter had on the development of international 
law, in this article I identify an undercurrent and a line of reasoning that 
run through the Grotian enterprise in De Iure Praedae and which I have 
broken down into three movements: first, the centrality of the theme 
                                                                                                             
 37. A fascinating near contemporaneous account of a prize capture by Dutch mer-
chant vessels has been left by Francesco Carletti, a Florentine merchant who was in 1601 
heading back to Europe with his goods aboard a Portuguese vessel when she was seized 
just off St. Helena. From Carletti’s perspective, the Dutch vessels were lying in wait and 
took the Santiago under the flimsiest of pretexts, occasioning the death of many crew and 
passengers. See FRANCESCO CARLETTI, VOYAGE AUTOUR DU MONDE DE FRANCESCO 
CARLETTI (1594–1606), at 267–84 (Paolo Carile ed., Frédérique Verrier trans., 1999). 
 38. Following a dynastic crisis caused by the untimely death without issue of King 
Sebastian, the crown of the Kingdom of Portugal had passed to Philip II, King of Spain, 
in 1580, a right Philip made good through conquest. Though they shared a sovereign 
from 1580 to 1640, relations between Spain and Portugal were far from amicable. The 
personal union of the two kingdoms under Philip, however, had a serious impact on the 
character of Portuguese-Dutch relations. 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 376–77 
(15th ed. 2005); 25 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 1056–57 (15th ed. 2005). 
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of commerce and Grotius’ elaboration of a right to engage in trade; sec-
ond, his expansion of just war doctrine to encompass just “private” war; 
and third, Grotius’ novel characterization of prize law as a mechanism 
whereby title to coercively acquired enemy “goods” is permanently 
transferred. In brief, my analysis of Grotius’ argument proceeds as fol-
lows: Responsive to the importance of international commerce, Grotius 
anchored Dutch national identity and sovereignty to the rock of seaborne 
long-distance trade and discovered a far reaching right to engage in trade 
founded on Divine Providence, natural reason and the consent of nations. 
Interference with this right, Grotius proclaimed, was not only a personal 
injury, but constituted a universal offense, comparable to piracy. On be-
half of the private (corporate) merchants sailing on the distant seas, 
Grotius reworked just war doctrine to encompass the possibility of just 
“private” war.  According to Grotius, in places such as the sea that were 
by nature free of jurisdiction, the private actor returned to his original 
sovereignty and could engage in just war in self-defense or in retaliation 
for injury, including an interference with the right to trade. In the course 
of a just war (whether public or private) the injured belligerent was enti-
tled to seize any enemy goods in reparation for the injury. A merchant 
vessel injured by interference with its right to engage in trade was thus 
privileged to seize an enemy vessel as prize. But seizure of property was 
not in itself sufficient to effect transfer of true title. Something more was 
needed. In Grotius’ analysis, this was the function of prize law. Prize law 
was the mechanism whereby title to property was transferred without the 
consent of the prior owner. Indeed, in a contemporaneous unpublished 
work, Commentarius Theses XI,39 Grotius had even gone so far as to ar-
gue that sovereignty itself could be lawfully transferred in the course of a 
just war through the mechanism of prize law. From the perspective of the 
merchants, however, the significance of prize law was that seized goods 
were freed to enter the market without taint, having become indistin-




                                                                                                             
 39. PETER BORSCHBERG, HUGO GROTIUS “COMMENTARIUS IN THESES XI”: AN EARLY 
TREATISE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THE JUST WAR, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DUTCH REVOLT 
269–83 (1994). 
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II. THE ROLE AND POWER OF “COMMERCE” AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE 
IN TRADE 
“Commerce” is at the heart of the Grotian enterprise in De Iure Prae-
dae; it is the cement that binds the work together. In this section I will 
focus on the manifold functions that commerce plays throughout 
Grotius’ oeuvre, and underline the originality of Grotius’ discovery of a 
right to engage in commerce. For Grotius, as we will see, international 
commerce is the life blood of the fledgling nation. He sees in it the natu-
ral character and destiny of the Dutch. It is also, and here Grotius taps 
into an already centuries’ long tradition, desired by God, as it brings 
peoples together, begetting peace and harmony in its wake. Some eighty 
years prior, Francisco de Vitoria had justified the New World’s conquest 
as a just response to the barbarians’ refusal to offer hospitality to the 
Spanish.40 Vitoria had evoked a right to hospitality (which included a 
right to engage in trade) to justify European violence against supposedly 
intractable New World barbarians.41 Despite his reliance on Vitoria, 
Grotius, as I will show, bypasses the issue of hospitality and discovers a 
natural right to engage in trade per se. Mutually beneficial, necessary for 
the vitality and integrity of the nation, and desired by God, commerce 
could, according to Grotius, only be secured by the assertion of such a 
right. Interference with the right could be considered tantamount to an 
injury, sufficient to give good cause for “just war.” In this way, Grotius 
expanded on a right that, in Vitoria, was no more than a consequence or 
effect of the right to hospitality. By finding a right to engage in trade out-
side of the context of a right to hospitality, I argue, Grotius opened up the 
category of those against whom a just war in defense of the right to trade 
could be fought to include other Europeans, perhaps for the first time 
explicitly justifying European violence against other Europeans on behalf 
of trade. 
As he introduces his project, Grotius opens with a declaration warning 
of the perils that will ensue if Dutch merchantmen are not allowed to en-
gage in prize taking: The Iberians will retain exclusive access to the East 
Indies and the Dutch economy will collapse. Grotius declares that the 
merchants must be encouraged to engage in prize taking through eco-
nomic incentives (a share in the profits) for otherwise they would quite 
reasonably not take the risk. Moreover, Grotius proclaims, prize taking is 
                                                                                                             
 40. VITORIA, supra note 8, at 119. See also Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and 
the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996). 
 41. For a more detailed discussion of Vitoria’s version of the right to engage in com-
merce, see infra text accompanying notes 95–100. 
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a most effective weapon granted by God to the Dutch for use against 
their Iberian enemies. Dutch liberty depended upon it: 
[I]f the Dutch cease to harass the Spanish [and Portuguese] blockaders 
of the sea (which will certainly be the outcome if their efforts result 
only in profitless peril), the savage insolence of the Iberian peoples will 
swell to immeasurable proportions, the shores of the whole world will 
soon be blocked off, and all commerce with Asia will collapse—that 
commerce by which (as the Dutch know, nor is the enemy ignorant of 
the fact) the wealth of our state is chiefly if not entirely sustained. On 
the other hand, if the Dutch choose to avail themselves of their good 
fortune, God has provided a weapon against the inmost heart of the en-
emy’s power, nor is there any weapon that offers a surer hope of lib-
erty.42 
Despite its rather strident tone, Grotius’ opening salvo perfectly con-
veys a series of connections he will develop throughout the work be-
tween Dutch prize taking, freedom of the seas, commerce, profit, wealth, 
the nation, and the prosecution of war. In Grotius’ account, defending the 
right of the Dutch to engage in the Indies commerce in the face of Iberian 
claims to exclusivity is of vital importance because the “wealth of our 
state is chiefly if not entirely sustained [by it].”43 Later, he will reiterate 
the claim in even stronger terms: 
[W]ho is so ignorant of the affairs of the Dutch as to be unaware of the 
fact that the sole source of support, renown, and protection for those af-
fairs lies in navigation and trade? Among all of the Dutch enterprises in 
the field of trade, moreover, our business in the East Indies easily oc-
cupies first place in worth, extent, and resultant benefits.44 
Empirically, the claim that the economy of the United Provinces was 
dependent on the Indies commerce was not only wrong, but quite mis-
guided.45 Yet Grotius can be excused for this rhetorical exaggeration, for, 
as evidenced in contemporary tracts, the promise of immense profits to 
be reaped from the Indies trade, occupied a place in the collective imagi-
nation quite incommensurate with its actual (or comparative) value.46 
The promise of almost inexhaustible riches available in the Indies had 
been fed not so much by the moderately successful trading ventures of 
                                                                                                             
 42. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1–2 (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 340. 
 45. See generally DE VRIES & VAN DER WOUDE, supra note 23. 
 46. See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 23; DE VRIES & VAN DER WOUDE, supra note 
23. 
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the Dutch, but by the immense riches discovered in the holds of the cap-
tured Portuguese prizes.47 
To be fair to Grotius, however, even if the direct Asian trade was not in 
the early seventeenth century a significant factor in the overall economic 
growth of the United Provinces, the carrying trade, along with the 
equally important fishing industry, was the backbone of the economy of 
the maritime provinces, and the merchants of Holland and Zeeland had 
certainly taken a big hit in the 1580s when they had been suddenly ex-
cluded from their role as Europe’s intermediaries for the Indies trade. 
That the future well-being of the United Provinces lay in continuing ex-
pansion in search of new trading opportunities was generally accepted. 
When, in early 1602, the States-General of the United Provinces labored 
to consolidate the small competing trading companies into a single 
United Dutch East India Company and granted it a twenty-one year mo-
nopoly, they were expressing a collective assessment that the success of 
the East India trade was important enough to the whole nation that it 
should be regulated and supported by that governing body of the new 
union, which had been given special responsibility for foreign affairs and 
naval and military matters.48 
Returning to Grotius’ opening statement, we can now trace the line of 
his reasoning. Because the Indies commerce is of vital importance not 
just to the prosperity, but to the very existence of the United Provinces, 
the Iberian blockade of the seas is a direct attack on the homeland itself. 
It is, he will later suggest, tantamount to an act of war. The “insolent” 
Iberians must thus be resisted at all costs. Dutch prize-taking is a form of 
harassment that disrupts the Iberians’ “insolent” ambition. Grotius takes 
                                                                                                             
 47. Grotius says of the prize aboard the Santa Catarina:  
Indeed, when the prize from the Catherine [Santa Catarina] was recently put 
up for sale, who did not marvel at the wealth revealed? Who was not struck 
with amazement? Who did not feel that the auction in progress was practically 
the sale of royal property, rather than of a fortune privately owned?  
1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 342. 
 48. The exact nature of the United Provinces as a political entity has always been 
difficult to describe. Neither unified state, nor federation as such, the Union, formed by 
seven “independent” Provinces, boasted in this period a complex, decentralized structure 
of authority. The States-General of the United Provinces shared sovereignty with the 
Provinces (each in turn enjoying its own unique form of decentralized power), a Council 
of State, an elected hereditary Stadholder (traditionally a member of the House of Or-
ange), and a Land’s Advocate or Council-Pensionary. Not surprisingly, the decisions of 
the States-General were often ignored by the provincial governments, and the mystery for 
contemporary observers was that the Union, despite its evident structural incoherence, 
somehow managed to be successful on a military front and to thrive economically. 
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for granted that Dutch merchantmen, rather than, for instance, a Dutch 
navy or a dedicated fleet of officially commissioned privateers, should be 
at the front line of the struggle over the freedom of the sea. Moreover, 
they should be entitled to reap the benefit of their seizure for if, warns 
Grotius, “the outcome of their efforts result only in profitless peril,” the 
Dutch merchantmen will “cease to harass the Spanish [and Portuguese] 
blockaders of the sea.” Grotius recognized that the Dutch vessels ventur-
ing into the seas of the East Indies were not bent on reckless adventure or 
heroic exploits; rather they were backed by serious capital investment in 
search of a good return. They were, in other words, commercial ventures 
limited by the willingness of the merchants to take a calculated financial 
risk. He also recognized, however, that from a commercial point of view 
it made little difference if the profits were achieved from goods acquired 
through regular trade or from plunder acquired through prize-taking—the 
only important issue was the rate of return on a particular investment. 
That Dutch merchants should be motivated by a healthy regard for the 
bottom line was, for Grotius, not only quite natural but a form of virtue. 
Indeed, Grotius proudly ascribes a mercantile character to the whole 
Dutch nation. According to Grotius, the Dutch are “a people surpassed 
by none in their eagerness for honorable gain.”49 There was, it is evident, 
nothing either shameful or sinful about the pursuit of profit by the Dutch. 
On the other hand, profit-seeking, if taken to excess, could become a vice 
and Grotius, in De Iure Praedae, drew a sharp contrast between the vir-
tuous pursuit of profit and a “consuming greed for gain,” which he quali-
fied as “a vile disease of the spirit.”50 As we might expect, throughout the 
text Grotius emphasizes that the Portuguese are driven by avarice and 
greed while he lauds the Dutch for their moderation. The Portuguese are, 
he insists, more like pirates than merchants.51 Nonetheless, concerned 
that some Dutch merchants might view prize-taking as tainted by its 
similarity to piracy, Grotius also warns that the Dutch should be mindful 
not to fall into the contrary vice of an excess of prudence, which might 
cause them to neglect opportunities to promote their own interest.52 
                                                                                                             
 49. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. “[T]he Portuguese, though they assume the guise of merchants, are not very dif-
ferent from pirates.” Id. at 327. 
 52. “[In abstention from greed], we should guard against excess,” as it is equally a sin 
to “neglect[] opportunities to promote one’s own interests.” Id. at 2. In chapter II, titled 
Prolegomena, the contrast is recast as that between self-interest, which is the right object 
of (divinely inspired self-love), “the first principle of the whole natural order,” and “im-
moderate self-interest,” a vice which results from an excess of such love. Id. at 9. 
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Grotius understands that the quest for profit is one of the primary mo-
tors of commerce. According to Grotius, however, the commercial activ-
ity of a merchant should be viewed as conferring a public benefit. Yet 
because he is also investing his labor and bearing a risk, a merchant 
should be justly rewarded. “[Commerce] was established in order that 
one person’s lack might be compensated by recourse to the abundance 
enjoyed by another, though not without a just profit for all individuals 
taking upon themselves the labour and peril involved in the process of 
transfer.”53 The merchant and his quest for profit are treated as eminently 
rational. In explaining why the prize (the Santa Catarina) “should” be 
granted to the merchants who had financed the company’s venture, 
Grotius does not mince words: “[T]he wise man does not incur expense 
unless the attendant risk is cancelled by the prospect of a fair profit.”54 
The quest for profits, the practice of commerce and even the acquisition 
of riches are all positive values for Grotius. In the closing chapter of De 
Iure Praedae, a chapter dedicated to demonstrating that the taking of the 
Santa Catarina was “beneficial,” as well as legal and honorable, he ar-
gues that spoils, so long as they are justly and honorably acquired are not 
to be spurned: “[S]poils are beneficial primarily because the individuals 
honourably enriched thereby are able to benefit many other persons, and 
because it is to the interest of the state that there should be a large num-
ber of wealthy citizens.”55 Riches, it would seem, circulate and bring 
benefit to many persons, while having rich citizens is an advantage to the 
state. Moreover, according to Grotius, even God’s eschatological plan is 
furthered by Dutch commercial success: 
Another aspect of the benefits to be received by the public lies in the 
fact that great numbers of the vast multitude comprising the common 
people are engaged in commerce or navigation and derive support from 
no other source. Thus it will come to pass, as Isaiah prophesied, that all 
merchandise and all profit shall be consecrated to the Lord: it shall not 
be treasured nor laid up, but shall be for them that dwell before the 
Lord, that they may eat unto fullness and be clothed sufficiently.56 
Whether he imagines it as held in the hands of wealthy citizens or serv-
ing the needs of the common people, riches from the East become virtu-
ous by association when owned by the Dutch. Unlike the Iberians, whose 
unhealthy and insatiable greed for riches led them to “spread terror 
throughout the world,” the riches obtained by the honorable and moder-
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 261 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 356. 
 55. Id. at 339 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 342–43 (emphasis added). 
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ate Dutch will serve “as a means of protecting life and liberty.”57 Indeed, 
so virtuous is the Dutch pursuit of wealth that God himself, according to 
Grotius, has intervened on behalf of the Dutch in their East Indies enter-
prise. In the face of the Spanish “savagery” that had interrupted Dutch 
commercial activities (in other regions), in response to the “ferocity of 
the foe,” who sought to keep them out from the Indies, God had resolved 
to point the Dutch in the right direction and brought their East Indies 
venture to fruition.58 In its vivid imagery which evokes tempests and 
snares and a journey into the unknown, the conflict between the Iberians 
and the Dutch takes on biblical proportions. There is no doubt about the 
identity of God’s elect. God’s care saves the Dutch from certain ruin and 
keeps them from the “dejection of spirit” that would have resulted from 
failure. Indeed, so attentive was God to the usefulness of Dutch success 
in the Indies that he had even inspired the States-General of the United 
Provinces to establish the VOC!59 
In fact, “commerce,” especially that characterized by long distance 
seaborne travel, had not always been applauded in the European, Chris-
tian tradition. Over the centuries, commerce was routinely decried for its 
propensity to encourage fraud, greed and avarice. Denounced for being 
excessively speculative, censured for presenting too great a hazard to life 
and property in the service of procuring unnecessary foreign luxuries, 
international commerce was also periodically deplored because it en-
couraged dependence rather than self-sufficiency.60 Grotius and many of 
his contemporaries, however, were drawn by an alternative, equally an-
cient, but radically different view of seaborne commerce. This view, 
dubbed the “doctrine of the providential function of commerce” by the 
economist Jacob Viner, holds that far from being a vicious and sinful 
practice, commerce is the handiwork of God himself, the result of God’s 
grand design—a human activity made necessary by God’s careful plan-
ning.61 The classic formulation of this doctrine, which Viner traced back 
to the fourth century, combined two related sets of assumptions concern-
ing God’s purpose and the function of trade. 
God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distrib-
uted His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might cultivate 
a social relationship because one would have need of the help of an-
other. And so he called commerce into being, that all men might be able 
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 60. See, e.g., JACOB VINER, THE ROLE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN THE SOCIAL ORDER: 
AN ESSAY IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 32–36 (1972). 
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to have common enjoyment of the fruits of earth, no matter where pro-
duced.62 
On this view, God’s ultimate purpose was that human beings should be 
sociable—“cultivate a social relationship”—with one another. Unfortu-
nately, left to his own devices, Man (in his fallen state) had a tendency to 
isolation. In order to remedy this problem, God had designed the world 
in such a way that no people or nation could ever hope to be self-
sufficient. God’s gifts were therefore judiciously dispersed across the 
world. Every nation lacked for something, while having an abundance of 
some other necessary good. By Divine design the problem of lack (or 
need) could be overcome only by means of exchange. Each nation could 
acquire what it lacked by supplying another nation with those gifts of 
which it had been given an abundance. Lack, the need for each others’ 
goods, generated a state of interdependence. To thrive, peoples could not 
remain in isolation but would have to enter into relationship with one 
another. And in this relationship lay harmony, friendship and even love. 
This is why God had brought commerce into being, that men might come 
to friendship. 
As Viner has shown, while the set of ideas which comprise this “doc-
trine of the providential function of commerce” resurfaced periodically 
over the centuries, it was never properly theorized. Rather, each state-
ment of the “doctrine” merely repeated the classic formulation within its 
own particular context. Moreover, even its proponents failed to recognize 
it as a distinctive philosophic or economic theory with a long pedigree. 
In De Iure Praedae, we find Grotius articulating his own elaborate ver-
sion of the doctrine, which he uses to support his contention that there is 
a natural right to engage in commerce: 
For God has not willed that nature shall supply every region with all the 
necessities of life; and furthermore, He has granted pre-eminence in 
different arts to different nations. Why are these things so, if not be-
cause it was His Will that human friendships should be fostered by mu-
tual needs and resources, lest individuals, in deeming themselves self-
sufficient, might thereby be rendered unsociable? In the existing state 
of affairs, it has come to pass, in accordance with the design of Divine 
Justice, that one nation supplies the needs of another, so that in this 
way (as Pliny observes) whatever has been produced in any region is 
regarded as a product native to all regions . . . . 
Consequently, anyone who abolishes the system of exchange abolishes 
also the highly prized fellowship in which humanity is united. He de-
stroys the opportunities for mutual benefactions. In short, he does vio-
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lence to nature herself. Consider the ocean, with which God has encir-
cled the different lands, and which is navigable from boundary to 
boundary; consider the breath of the winds in their regular courses and 
in their special deviations, blowing not always from one and the same 
region but from every region at one time or another: are these things 
not sufficient indications that nature has granted every nation access to 
every other nation? In Seneca’s opinion, the supreme blessing con-
ferred by nature resides in these facts: that by means of the winds she 
brings together peoples who are scattered in different localities, and 
that she distributes the sum of her gifts throughout various regions in 
such a way as to make a reciprocal commerce a necessity of the mem-
bers of the human race.63 
The conventional elements of the doctrine are all here, along with a 
number of additional flourishes. God desires human sociability. To 
achieve his purpose in the face of mankind’s predilection for isolationism 
and self-sufficiency, God has deliberately granted different gifts to di-
verse peoples while permitting that each nation suffer lack in some re-
spect, thus fostering a condition of mutual need and interdependence. 
Commerce abolishes lack by supplying the needed resources in the 
course of mutual exchange, thereby bringing peoples together in friend-
ship. Reciprocity is the quality of commercial exchange most highlighted 
by Grotius. According to Grotius, commerce brought about mutual ad-
vantage. Since by definition friendship was a relationship that produced 
mutual advantage, commerce could be said to engender friendship.64 
Those who traded with another across the oceans would become 
friends.65 Friendship brought humanity together in love, producing a 
harmony pleasing to God. Universalizing in its sweep, the “doctrine” 
recast differences across the world as providential and non-essential. East 
Indian peoples, despite their distance and strangeness, could be depicted 
by Grotius as reaching out to the Dutch, desiring to be embraced in the 
circle of mutual exchange.66 Nonetheless, while all peoples could reach 
out in desire, only the merchants in their vessels held the key; only they 
could put an end to geographical separation by traversing the oceans: 
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 66. Grotius makes repeated reference to the East Indians’ desire to enter into com-
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ples encounter the virtuous Dutch merchants, who, in Grotius’ account, desire nothing 
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they were the midwives of the brave new world community. In this role 
the Dutch held a place of honor, for Dutch geography and character had, 
it seemed, combined to produce a nation turned in a special way to this 
philanthropic maritime enterprise: 
[E]veryone knows that the situation of the Dutch coast and the assiduity 
of the natives are such that merchandise is very conveniently trans-
ported from all parts of the said coast to all other localities whatsoever, 
since a natural bent (so to speak) for maritime enterprise characterizes 
our people, who regard it as the most agreeable of all occupations to 
aid humanity, while finding a ready means for self-support, through an 
international exchange of benefits from which no one suffers loss.67 
Here again are the familiar themes. Commerce is a peaceable activity, 
everyone stands to benefit and so it follows that those who engage in 
commerce are serving humanity.68 
The corollary of this line of reasoning (or “doctrine”), as Grotius 
makes explicit in the earlier quote, is that interference with commerce is 
interference with an activity that serves mutual advantage. It interferes 
with the forging of friendship, and fosters disharmony: It is, in other 
words, an interference with God’s work. “Consequently, anyone who 
abolishes the system of exchange abolishes also the highly prized fellow-
ship in which humanity is united. He destroys the opportunities for mu-
tual benefactions. In short, he does violence to nature herself.”69 By 
means of the “doctrine of the providential function of commerce,” 
Grotius elevates the offense of the Portuguese to a crime against nature, 
an affront to God’s design. The Iberian blockade of the oceans, the Por-
tuguese refusal to allow Dutch merchants to engage in trade with the East 
Indies, is no longer condemned merely as an attack on the economic 
well-being (and existence) of the United Provinces, it is rather an affront 
to all of humanity, a humanity in search of a means to overcome lack 
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Kant who in 1795 wrote an essay arguing for a cosmopolitan right to engage in com-
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 69. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 218. 
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while finding a corresponding outlet for its resources, a humanity eager 
in its desire for fellowship and sociability. All of humanity is implicated, 
and the depraved Iberians worthy of universal abhorrence, for, says 
Grotius: “[T]here is no stronger reason underlying our abhorrence of 
robbers and pirates than the fact that they besiege and render unsafe the 
thoroughfares of human intercourse.”70 Toward the end of his treatise 
Grotius takes the analogy one step further, alleging that the Portuguese 
are pirates and should be treated as such: 
For if the name of ‘pirate’ is appropriately bestowed upon men who 
blockade the seas and impede the progress of international commerce, 
shall we not include under the same head those who forcibly bar all 
European nations (even nations that have given them no cause for war) 
from the ocean and from access to India . . . ? Therefore, since it was 
invariably held in ancient times that persons of this kind were worthy 
objects of universal hatred in that they were harmful to all mankind, 
and since even now there is no one, or at the most a very few individu-
als who would absolve the Portuguese from the charge of belonging to 
this class, why should anyone fear that he might incur ill will by inflict-
ing punishment on them?71 
The “doctrine of the providential function of commerce” was peculiarly 
well adapted to a commercial people, one newly attractive in an age 
seeking to ennoble and justify commercial expansion. Over time, it 
would come to enjoy the dubious privilege of a tenet of faith, a belief 
stated and firmly held, but rarely examined.72 As we have seen, in 
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 71. Id. at 327. While Grotius has Portuguese vessels in mind, it is evident that from 
another point of view, he is essentially claiming that Portugal itself is a piratical nation, 
worthy of universal abhorrence and subject to punishment by all. The reasoning, it is 
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 72. A near contemporary deployment of the “doctrine” is clearly discernible in a letter 
entrusted by Queen Elizabeth to Sir James Lancaster, commander of the first fleet to sail 
from England on behalf of the newly chartered East India Company (1600): 
ELIZABETH by the Grace of God, Queene of England, France, and Ireland, 
defendresse of the Christian Faith and Religion. To his great and mightie King 
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ings, and good things of his Creation, for the use and nourishment of Mankind, 
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universall World. To the end, that even therein may appeare unto all Nations, 
his marvellous workes, hee having so ordained, that the one land may have 
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Grotius’ hands, the “doctrine” acquired a significant new element, for 
Grotius makes an explicit association between the “doctrine” and a right 
to engage in commerce. Grotius, however, fails to spell out the nature of 
the connection. Rather, he appears to find the “right” inherent in the 
“doctrine,” as absent the right; God’s plan, expressed in the “doctrine,” 
would be frustrated. In order to understand why he finds it unnecessary 
to explain the relationship between the “doctrine of the providential func-
tion of commerce” and a right to engage in commerce, we must turn back 
to the theory of justice that Grotius develops in the Prolegomena of De 
Iure Praedae, which frames the subsequent legal arguments, for Grotius 
is too much of a modern to be satisfied with affirming the existence of a 
right based on nothing more than divine authority. Yet, in the end, as we 
will see, Grotius’ elegant analysis fails to produce any basis for a right to 
engage in commerce more substantive than that of Divine design. 
In the Prolegomena, by methods he describes as mathematical and 
proper to natural reason, Grotius perfects a comprehensive theory of jus-
tice comprised of two related legal systems. Grotius begins by describing 
and deriving the sources and content of natural law and then proceeds to 
elaborate the sources and content of positive law. Altogether, Grotius 
posits nine general “rules” (principles) from which he derives thirteen 
“laws” (precepts).73 Of these, the first three principles and the first six 
precepts concern natural law proper and serve as a source for positive 
law, whereas the final six principles and five precepts are within the ex-
clusive domain of positive law. Together, the nine general principles and 
thirteen precepts, combining natural and positive law, function as the 
“preliminary assumptions” or “premises” that Grotius claims as the 
foundation for his legal arguments in De Iure Praedae. 
The first principle with which Grotius launches his analysis in the Pro-
legomena, the principle to which he ascribes “pre-eminent authority” is 
that: “What God has shown to be his Will, that is law.”74 Law, as used 
here by Grotius, is that which is commanded. “In any case,” he adds, 
                                                                                                             
need of the other. And thereby, not only breed intercourse and exchange of 
their Merchandise and Fruits, which doe superabound in some Countries, and 
want in others: but also ingender love and friendship betwixt all men, a thing 
naturally diuine. 
Markley, supra note 29, at 497–98 (emphasis added). 
 73. Grotius’ terminology of “rules” and “laws” in the Prolegomena is confusing and 
somewhat misleading. What he means by these terms is better conveyed by the alterna-
tive terms he also sometimes employs: “principle” for “rule” and “precept” for “law.” In 
an attempt to minimize confusion I have chosen to substitute the terms “principle” and 
“precept” throughout the remainder of my discussion of Grotius’ theory of justice. 
 74. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 8. 
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“the act of commanding is a function of power, and primary power over 
all things pertains to God . . . .”75 “The Will of God,” pursues Grotius, “is 
revealed, not only through oracles and supernatural portents, but above 
all in the very design of the Creator; for it is from this last source that the 
law of nature is derived.”76 In other words, the first principle is nothing 
other than the instauration of the “design of the Creator” as the ultimate 
source of natural law. From here it is an easy step for Grotius to ascertain 
that “since God fashioned creation and willed its existence, every indi-
vidual part thereof has received from Him certain natural properties 
whereby that existence may be preserved . . . .”77 What Grotius discovers 
in God’s design is that God wills the self-preservation of his creation. 
From this he makes a case for self-interest, characterizing it as the first 
object of love: “[L]ove, whose primary force and action are directed to 
self-interest, is the first principle of the whole natural order.”78 From the 
beginning, Grotius seems to have the virtuous profit-seeking merchant in 
mind: The prototypical Dutchman motivated by the right kind of self-
interest. As if to ensure that the point is not lost, Grotius reiterates that 
“the first principle of a man’s duty relates to himself.”79 He then pro-
ceeds to distinguish the right kind of moderate self-interest from immod-
erate self-interest, which he describes as “an excess of self love.” 
Consequently, from the first principle—God’s will—Grotius, applying 
the methods of logical proof, derives what he terms the two most impor-
tant “precepts” of the law of nature, which are both concerned with self-
preservation: “It shall be permissible to defend one’s own life and to 
shun that which proves injurious” [Precept 1]; and “It shall be permissi-
ble to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for 
life” [Precept 2].80 Grotius then uses the first principle, “What God has 
shown to be His Will, that is law,”81 along with the two derivative pre-
cepts—the right to self-defense and the right to acquisition and use—to 
elaborate what we may call a theory of proto-property in the state of na-
ture82 —a theory which assumes a “common grant” but a right of seizure 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 10. 
 81. Id. at 8. 
 82. Grotius never makes use of the term “state of nature,” but both here and else-
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communities and the advent of civil law. It is important, however, to recognize that 
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768 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:3 
for individual use.83 Only after a duty of self-interest and a protean form 
of property rights in the state of nature has been established does Grotius 
turn to the duty to care for the “welfare of our fellow beings”—Grotius 
also seems to discover this duty from God’s design. In Grotius’ words: 
God judged that there would be insufficient provision for the preserva-
tion of His works, if He commended to each individual’s care only the 
safety of that particular individual, without also willing that one created 
being should have regard for the welfare of his fellow beings, in such a 
way that all might be linked in mutual harmony as if by an everlasting 
covenant.84 
As with the contrast Grotius draws between self-love and excessive 
self-love, these images have a familiar ring. They are after all a form of 
the claim about God’s divine interest and purpose in commerce. God’s 
will is that men care for each other’s welfare (love one another) so that 
there might be sufficient provision for the preservation of all, and that 
they might be linked in mutual harmony. 
In Grotius’ system of law, the first principle and its two derivative pre-
cepts hold a place of honor, for they are derived directly from the design 
or will of God. Next in line is what Grotius terms the “primary law of 
nations.” In Grotius’ rendering, the primary law of nations, though it 
arises out of the mutual accord of human beings, is (indirectly) received 
from God, for it is born of man’s rational faculty, which is the imprint of 
God’s image in man. Grotius articulates it as the Second Principle: 
“What the common consent of mankind has shown to be the will of all, 
that is law.”85 It is important to note that in Grotius’ system of law we 
are still in a period prior to civil society and prior to the division of the 
world into separate polities. What Grotius seems to have in mind here is 
a minimalist but universal ethic, which has the force of law (or com-
mand). According to Grotius, what mankind agrees on is “that it behoves 
us to have a care for the welfare of others,”86 which he understands to be 
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the basis of a kind of universal society and at the origin of justice.87 
Bringing together his first two principles, the force of command arising 
out of divine will and from the common consent of mankind, two forces 
which according to Grotius can never be in opposition, Grotius derives 
two further precepts that should guide human beings’ relationship with 
others. These take the form of prohibitions: the precept of inoffensive-
ness (in other words, don’t injure others) [Precept 3], and the precept of 
abstinence (that is, don’t seize another’s possession) [Precept 4].88 In a 
certain respect, these two prohibitions could be understood as the nega-
tive limits of the first two precepts concerning self-interest: the right to 
self-defense and the right to acquisition and use. Grotius then rounds out 
these four precepts with two further precepts, which he qualifies as being 
precepts of justice: evil deeds must be corrected (retaliation or punish-
ment) [Precept 5]; and good deeds must be recompensed (restitution or 
reward) [Precept 6].89 Finally, Grotius enunciates a third principle—the 
principle of good faith—which stands at the origin of pacts (and con-
tracts).90 Up to this point in the analysis, Grotius’ objective has been to 
establish a system of natural law, the set of principles and precepts that 
govern human beings even before the advent of civil society. Natural 
law, for Grotius, is the law of the universal human society, a superior law 
that precedes civil law and can never be abolished. Indeed, when Grotius 
at last turns to the subject of civil society and positive law, these are pre-
sented as necessary evils in a post-lapsarian world. 
When it came to pass, after these principles had been established, that 
many persons (such is the evil growing out of the nature of some men!) 
either failed to meet their obligations or even assailed the fortunes and 
the very lives of others, for the most part without suffering punishment 
. . . there arose the need for a new remedy, lest the laws of human soci-
ety be cast aside as invalid.91 
The need was urgent, there were more human beings, they were scattered 
about “with vast distances separating them and were being deprived of 
opportunities for mutual benefaction.”92 According to Grotius, these con-
ditions lead men to gather into social units, and this movement in turn 
gives birth to the commonwealth—“not with the intention of abolishing 
the society which links all men as a whole, but rather in order to fortify 
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that universal society by a more dependable means of protection . . . .”93 
Again we find in Grotius’ depiction an emphasis on vast distances sepa-
rating men and the claim that they were being deprived of opportunities 
for mutual benefaction. The remedy here, however, is not commerce but 
the political community, which is a replica in miniature of the world so-
ciety. The commonwealth is not, in its essence, part of the problem of 
fracture and estrangement but part of the solution. Civil or municipal 
law, according to Grotius, exists to support and strengthen natural law, 
which is why it can never contradict it. The closer bonds of friendship 
that unite a commonwealth do not extinguish the natural bonds of uni-
versal human society; rather they should serve to strengthen them. Fol-
lowing the discussion of municipal law, Grotius turns to what he terms 
“the secondary law of nations.” This he considers “a species of mixed 
law, compounded of the [primary] law of nations and municipal law        
. . . .”94 
Fortunately it is not necessary for us to follow Grotius in his lengthy 
analysis of civil law or the secondary law of nations, for the right to en-
gage in commerce is never mentioned explicitly by Grotius in these sec-
tions of the Prolegomena. While a right to engage in commerce is not 
specifically identified in the section on natural law either, I have tried to 
demonstrate that each line of Grotius’ analysis seems to imply its neces-
sity. As we have seen, in Chapter XII, Grotius appears to imply the right 
from the need to give effect to God’s beneficent will as described in the 
“doctrine of the providential function of commerce.” In the Prolegom-
ena, Grotius presents God’s will as the first and most authoritative prin-
ciple in the systematic analysis of law. God’s will is presented as the 
source of authority and command, yet it must be ascertained from God’s 
design. As Grotius deciphers God’s plan in the section on natural law, 
elements from the “doctrine” make their appearance. God’s particular 
plan concerning the distribution of scarcity and abundance, needs and 
resources, and God’s desire that mankind enter into fellowship through 
the process of exchange, is played out in a variety of registers. At length, 
the “doctrine” appears to inhabit both the structure and the substance of 
the natural law. Commerce becomes a necessity to protect self-interest 
and to serve the welfare of others. The right to engage in trade must be 
asserted to give effect to God’s will. 
Grotius, it should be noted, was not the first to make reference to a 
right to engage in commerce; rather, he was able to rely on the earlier 
work of the Spanish Dominican theologian and legal theorist Francisco 
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de Vitoria. Yet as my analysis will show, Grotius’ right to engage in 
commerce was a radical revision of the right first identified by Vitoria. In 
1539, three quarters of a century before Grotius, in a lecture later pub-
lished as De Indis, Vitoria had argued that the refusal of Native Ameri-
cans to allow the Spaniards to carry on trade with them was a wrong that 
provided sufficient justification for the Spaniards to initiate a “just war” 
against them.95 According to Vitoria, the native lands that had fallen into 
Spanish possession in the course of such a just war, could be lawfully 
seized and might be legitimately kept. Unlike Grotius, however, Vitoria 
had not based his claim on a strong version of the doctrine of the provi-
dential function of commerce. Indeed, it is not clear that he had intended 
to assert an autonomous and distinctive “right to engage in trade,” as 
Grotius proceeded to do. Vitoria’s overall objective in De Indis is to clar-
ify the legal relationship that exists between the Spaniards and the New 
World natives whose lands they have conquered. The specific legal ques-
tion that motivates the work is whether the Spanish conquest of native 
lands in the New World in the early sixteenth century was justly under-
taken. In De Indis, Vitoria begins by critiquing the arguments or “titles” 
by which the Spaniards had until then conventionally justified their con-
quest. According to Vitoria, neither discovery, the Pope’s or the Em-
peror’s authority, nor the natives’ unbelief or sinfulness, could in them-
selves justify dispossessing the natives of their lands. Having dismissed 
the traditional claims, Vitoria turned his attention to possible “just titles” 
that might nonetheless justify the conquest. The first “just title” that Vi-
toria proposes is “that of natural society and fellowship.”96 Vitoria’s first 
conclusion under this title is that: 
The Spaniards have a right to travel into the lands in question and to so-
journ there, provided they do no harm to the natives, and the natives 
may not prevent them. 
Proof of this may in the first place be derived from the law of nations 
(jus gentium), which either is natural law or is derived from natural law 
(Inst., I, 2, I): “What natural reason has established among all nations is 
called the jus gentium.” For, congruently herewith, it is reckoned 
among all nations inhumane to treat visitors and foreigners badly with-
out some special cause, while, on the other hand, it is humane and cor-
rect to treat visitors well; but the case would be different, if the foreign-
ers were to misbehave when visiting other nations. 
Secondly, it was permissible from the beginning of the world (when 
everything was in common) for any one to set forth and travel 
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wheresoever he would. Now this was not taken away by the division of 
property, for it was never the intention of peoples to destroy by that di-
vision the reciprocity and common uses which prevailed among men, 
and indeed in the days of Noah it would have been inhumane to do so.97 
While the reference to “reciprocity” and the mention of “division” hint 
at some connection with the “doctrine of the providential function of 
commerce,” the accent is clearly on showing hospitality to strangers and 
on sociability. The story Vitoria is telling is that of a world before prop-
erty or political boundaries. At that time everyone was free to wander 
about, to travel and visit without limitation. The “division of property” 
was not intended to abolish this original (and universal) privilege, be-
cause such an abolition would have been considered “inhumane.” Hu-
manity itself imposes a duty of hospitality and sociability on the natives. 
Twelve additional proofs are then mustered by Vitoria to support the 
proposition that the Spaniards have the right to travel and sojourn in na-
tive lands. 
The second proposition that Vitoria develops under the “just title” of 
“natural society and fellowship” is that: 
The Spaniards may lawfully carry on trade among the native Indians, 
so long as they do no harm to their country, as, for instance, by import-
ing thither wares which the natives lack and by exporting thence either 
gold or silver or other wares of which the natives have abundance. Nei-
ther may the native princes hinder their subjects from carrying on trade 
with the Spanish; nor, on the other hand, may the princes of Spain pre-
vent commerce with the natives. This is proved by means of my first 
proposition. [That concerning the “right” to travel and sojourn.]98 
Vitoria bases this second proposition on the law of nations and divine 
law (which he says is not opposed to it) and then adds that in any case, 
“the sovereign of the Indians is bound by the law of nature to love the 
Spaniards. Therefore, the Indians may not causelessly prevent the Span-
iards from making their profit where this can be done without injury to 
themselves.”99 This curious addition reminds us that for the Spanish 
theologian, the ultimate optic through which law, whether natural, di-
vine, international, or human, is examined, is that of “love”—which is 
what the duty of hospitality to strangers and sociability is all about. 
When the Indians of the New World refuse to enter into commercial rela-
tionship with the visiting Spaniards, their offense is an offense against 
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love. That the offense against love has a potential economic dimension is 
noted, but not given center stage.100 
Unlike Vitoria, in De Iure Praedae, Grotius places commerce squarely 
at the heart of his analysis. When he refers to Vitoria’s earlier work, he 
quotes him approvingly, but he reverses the order of things. Vitoria had 
started with the duty of hospitality to strangers and sociability. Love of 
neighbor was the guiding principle. The privileges of the Spaniards to 
travel or sojourn, to trade, to share in the common goods, to dwell in na-
tive lands and to acquire nationality were all derivative from the duty of 
hospitality. Grotius, on the other hand, begins by claiming that the “doc-
trine of the providential function of commerce,” as he has elaborated it 
“is the source of the sacrosanct law of hospitality.”101 Vitoria, says 
Grotius, holds that: 
[I]f the Spaniards should be prohibited by the American Indians from 
traveling or residing among the latter, or if they should be prevented 
from sharing in those things which are common property under the law 
of nations or by custom—if, in short, they should be debarred from the 
practice of commerce—these causes might serve them as just grounds 
for war against the Indians; and indeed as grounds more plausible than 
others.102 
Hospitality, the right to travel or reside, the right to share in the common 
ownership—all these are for Grotius merely expressions of the practice 
of commerce. 
The distinction between the two men may seem minor, yet Grotius’ re-
versal of terms had an important consequence. In Vitoria’s scheme, the 
Indians, if they prevented the Spaniards from enjoying any of the 
“rights” to which they were entitled under the head of duties of “hospital-
ity and sociability,” including the “right” to trade, would be causing an 
offense to the Spaniards, and the Spaniards would have sufficient cause 
to initiate a “just war.” The fundamental offense of the Indians was a 
refusal to engage in a loving relationship with the Spaniards. The only 
“injured” party, under this system, was the party with whom the Indians 
refused to engage. Such an injury was limited in range because it was a 
personal injury. No third party could claim to be injured by the Indians’ 
refusal to offer hospitality to the Spaniards. Furthermore, while in theory 
the right and the potential injury were universal, in practice, it was evi-
dent that it could only be used to justify a European “just war” against 
barbarians. Its claims, based on a universal duty of hospitality and socia-
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bility, assumed both no prior (commercial) relationship and non-
Christian peoples, as a common Christianity was considered a bond of 
love. No European nation would be able to assert it against another. By 
placing the accent on commerce and on a right to engage in commerce, 
Grotius’ reversal partly eliminated this limitation. 
The offense of the Portuguese against the Dutch in the East Indies was 
clearly not an offense against hospitality. Instead, the Portuguese injury 
was the interference with a trading relationship between third parties. 
The injury based on a right to engage in trade had become, in Grotius’ 
hands, good cause to justify a European nation’s initiating “just war” 
against another European nation. Furthermore, the Portuguese blockade 
of the seas could now be viewed as not only an injury against the Dutch, 
but as an offense against the East Indian peoples who sought to enter into 
a mutually advantageous commercial relationship with the Dutch. It 
could even be viewed as a universal injury, for the blockade affected all 
of humanity in its pursuit of greater harmony and sociability. Europeans 
defending their right against other Europeans could thus perceive them-
selves as triply virtuous. 
III. JUST WAR—SOVEREIGN ANXIETY, PRIVATE WAR AND THE 
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 
The framework within which Grotius explored and developed his ideas 
on commerce, the right to engage in commerce, war and prize law in De 
Iure Praedae was the doctrine of just war. The just war doctrine, trace-
able in its Christian form back to Augustine, had received its classic for-
mulation in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica,103 written in the four-
teenth century. In the course of this important and immensely influential 
theological treatise, Aquinas raised the question that had plagued 
thoughtful Christians since their beginning: Was waging war against 
God’s law? Was it, in other words, a sin? Though he discusses “war” 
under the heading of “vices” that offend against “charity (love),” Aqui-
nas nonetheless sides with the pragmatic and fiery Augustine in holding 
that under the right conditions some wars are just, and therefore not sin-
ful: 
In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the au-
thority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For 
it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he 
can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. . . . 
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, 
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should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault      
. . . . Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful 
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoid-
ance of evil.104 
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Aquinas’ formulation and his 
three conditions for “just war:” sovereign authority, just cause and right 
intention, had become the standard. Moreover, Aquinas’ theological doc-
trine had quickly been transposed into the kindred realm of law. Vitoria, 
for instance, expounded on Aquinas’ doctrine of just war in his Second 
Relectio, Sive De Ivre Bellis Hispanorvm in Barbaros (On the Law of 
War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians),105 the companion piece 
to De Indis. Familiar as it was, the young Grotius considered the “law of 
war” to be in certain respects, “exceedingly confused,”106 and one of his 
stated purposes in De Iure Praedae was to clarify it once and for all. 
The specific legal controversy that Grotius sought to address in De Iure 
Praedae was whether the taking of the Santa Catarina was legitimate.107 
For Grotius, the answer to this question was bound up with a proper un-
derstanding of the doctrine of “just war.” The Santa Catarina, a Portu-
guese merchant ship, had been violently attacked and seized by a Dutch 
merchant vessel on the high seas. From a legal perspective, the only way 
to render this violent act legitimate, rather than a reprehensible act of 
piracy, was to show that the Santa Catarina had been taken in the course 
of just war and had accordingly become a lawful prize—enemy property 
taken in the course of a just war. Such a demonstration required that 
Grotius apply just war doctrine to the facts of the case. From a certain 
perspective, we might have expected the application to be quite straight-
forward. After all, the Santa Catarina was a Portuguese vessel and the 
Dutch were at war with the King of Spain, who was now also the King of 
Portugal. This much seemed easily ascertainable. Thus, all that Grotius 
would have to show was that the ongoing Dutch war against Spain (and 
Portugal) was a just war. The rest would follow. The case, however, did 
not prove so easy to resolve for the facts were somewhat contentious and 
made application of the traditional doctrine awkward. In brief, Grotius 
was laboring under three disabilities: First, the sovereignty of the United 
Provinces was in question; second, it was not certain that the Portuguese 
were at war with the Dutch; and third, the Dutch merchant fleet was pri-
vately owned and not officially commissioned as a privateer. In order to 
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arrive at a satisfying resolution in face of these messy facts, Grotius 
could not simply apply the doctrine of just war as he found it in Aquinas 
and Vitoria; instead he found it necessary to modify and round it out. In a 
masterly fashion Grotius was then able to apply a revised doctrine to the 
facts in a series of variations that all confirmed the existence of a just war 
and thus established the legitimacy of the taking. 
In seeking to elaborate his own theory of just war in De Iure Praedae, 
however, Grotius had to work within the constraints of the already well- 
established formulation of just war doctrine. He had to contend with 
Aquinas’ three conditions: sovereign authority, just cause, and right in-
tention.108 Aquinas’ first condition, that there be a sovereign by whose 
authority the war was to be waged, had two constraining functions: First, 
it sought to restrict the scope of just war to public war, thus delegitimiz-
ing the concept of private war, for: “If an individual had a quarrel, he 
could seek redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior.”109 In 
Aquinas’ view, “strife” or private war was always a sin “because it takes 
place between private persons, being declared not by public authority, 
but rather by an inordinate will.”110 The only partial concession he made 
was in the case of self-defense. Even then, Aquinas imposed two addi-
tional conditions, requiring that the defender not be motivated by hatred 
or vengeance and that he not exceed moderation in defending himself. 
Under those circumstances, according to Aquinas, private war or strife 
might be considered no more than a venal sin. The second constraining 
function of Aquinas’ condition of “sovereign” authority was to limit as 
much as possible the circle of those wielding public authority who might 
legitimately undertake a war. In theory at least, the smaller the circle, the 
less war was likely. Consequently, only those fighting a war authorized 
by the sovereign himself might be entitled to the immunity from sin con-
ferred by just war doctrine. 
For Grotius, each dimension of Aquinas’ condition of “sovereign au-
thority” posed a difficulty. He had to address two obvious problems: The 
first concerned the validity of the claim to sovereignty of the United 
Provinces. Under this head, there were two issues with which Grotius 
had to contend: the Spanish counterclaim that the United Provinces 
should be considered a rebellious province, and the fact that sovereignty 
in the United Provinces, even if it could be claimed, was a dispersed and 
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disaggregated affair little resembling the conventional notion of the sov-
ereign prince. The second problem that Grotius had to address remained 
the ticklish matter of the private character of the Dutch vessels that had 
seized the Santa Catarina. Indeed, buried within the folds of De Iure 
Praedae we can detect two related and powerful anxieties over distinc-
tions that Grotius’ analysis seeks to dispel: First is the anxiety over how 
to distinguish rebels from sovereigns, and second is an anxiety over the 
boundary between the inherently unstable categories of piracy and free-
bootery. In both cases, as we will see, the boundary would be determined 
in Grotius’ work by a proper understanding of just war and sovereignty. 
In the early seventeenth century, when Grotius worked on the text of 
De Iure Praedae, Philip III, King of Spain, still deemed the citizens of 
the United Provinces as little more than rebellious subjects. Until his 
death in 1598, King Philip II, who had never recognized the authority of 
the States-General to depose him, had waged an unrelenting war against 
them. After his death, due to a financial crisis, the conflict entered a 
cooler phase, but it is evident that his son, Philip III, had not renounced, 
and despite the escalating costs of the war, did not intend to renounce, 
his historical claim to sovereignty over all of the erstwhile Burgundian 
lands in the Low Countries. For the Spanish Habsburgs, the Low Coun-
tries were no peripheral outpost; they were a strategic political and eco-
nomic pivot of the massive empire, entranceway to the heart of Europe 
as well as center of their own family identity.111 Moreover, in 1581, at 
the time of the deposition of Philip II, the States-General had not imme-
diately declared themselves a Republic. Instead, they searched for a sub-
stitute prince to exercise sovereignty over them. Both Henry IV, King of 
France, and Elizabeth I, Queen of England, had their own quarrels with 
Philip II; both welcomed the disturbance in the Low Counties as a dis-
traction and an expense for their enemy, yet neither was eager to do 
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much more than assist the rebels financially and, in the case of England, 
strategically. Not only did neither sovereign relish a new cause of war 
with Spain, but neither could approve subjects who rose in rebellion 
against their legitimate sovereign. Having failed to convince any prince 
to take on the job of sovereign, in 1585, the States-General of the United 
Provinces came to a compromise and voted to accept a governor-general 
appointed by a reluctant Queen Elizabeth. This politically delicate and 
controversial arrangement, much disapproved by the powerful Province 
of Holland, had in any case fallen through within two years. Only follow-
ing this fiasco did the United Provinces decide at last to proceed without 
a “foreign” sovereign. Even then, however, the provinces did not draw 
up anything resembling a federal constitution. Instead their political sys-
tem remained ad hoc and pragmatic.112 The United Provinces was at base 
a defensive union of self-governing provinces, each jealous of its historic 
rights and privileges. The self-governing provincial authorities did not 
consider themselves bound by the dictates of the central authority of the 
States-General. Even Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, Commander 
of the Army and Admiral of the Navy, was not really a “prince,” but the 
appointed “Stadtholder” or “governor” over five of the provinces, (while 
his cousin was recognized as Stadtholder over the remaining two). Sov-
ereignty, such as it was, was dispersed across a bewildering array of pub-
lic authorities in the United Provinces. 
Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Grotius at the turn 
of the century should evidence some anxiety over the question of 
whether there was a sovereign in the United Provinces, with authority to 
engage in “just war,” under the Aquinan formulation. Given that civil 
war under Aquinas’ definition could never be just, Grotius’ first task was 
to show the United Provinces were not engaged, as the King of Spain 
would have it, in a civil war of rebellion against their legitimate sover-
eign.113 The argument Grotius makes in De Iure Praedae to counter the 
charge of rebellion closely tracks the analysis he develops at greater 
length in the near contemporaneous Commentarius in Theses XI.114 In 
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short, the accusation of rebellion is answered by recourse to a theory of 
sovereignty which relies on a non-unified concept of sovereignty, as 
against the dominant Bodinian model,115 and which places the nation be-
fore sovereignty, rather than having the sovereign define the nation. 
In Grotius’ historical account of the events that led to the Dutch revolt, 
the spark was lit when the Duke of Alba, appointed by Philip II to govern 
the Low Countries, exceeded his legitimate sovereign powers by attempt-
ing to alter some laws and judicial procedures and impose additional 
taxes on the citizens of the Province of Holland without seeking the ap-
proval of the local authority, an injustice which led to a popular uprising. 
At length, the States-Assembly of Holland, which, according to Grotius, 
had been “a true commonwealth for all of seven centuries” and was “a 
guardian of the rights of the people,”116 gathered in assembly and under 
its own authority declared war against Alba. This war was then joined by 
other peoples in the Low Countries. The resulting conflict was by all ac-
counts exceedingly cruel and expensive: 
It would be too long a story, if we attempted to tell what quantities of 
blood have been shed from that time on; what plundering on the part of 
the Spaniards and what expenditures on the opposite side have drained 
the resources of the Low Countries (expenses so heavy, in fact, that an 
accurate reckoning would show them to be in excess of those borne by 
any other people in any age) . . . .”117 
Philip II, rather than punish the excesses of the Duke of Alba, had en-
couraged them and, says Grotius, “sought to obtain by force of arms a 
power greater than was legitimate” until, having no other recourse, the 
States-General had deposed him: “This was the beginning of the move-
ment in which oaths were taken in support of the sovereignty of the 
States-General as against Philip.”118 
Augustine in the fourth century had proclaimed that the end of just war 
was peace, and that “the natural order, the order adapted to the mainte-
nance of peace among mortals, demands that authority and discretion for 
the undertaking of wars should reside in princes.”119 As we have seen, 
Aquinas too had sought to constrain the scope of just war to sovereigns. 
Vitoria, concurring with Augustine and Aquinas, had nonetheless stated 
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the proposition in a slightly different form. Vitoria had emphasized that 
the authority to wage war resided in the state, rather than in the sover-
eign. He had, however, also insisted that, “where there are already lawful 
princes in a State, all authority is in their hands and without them nothing 
of a public nature can be done either in war or in peace.”120 In addressing 
the further question of what was to count as a state, Vitoria had offered 
the definition that: “A perfect State or community . . . is one which is 
complete in itself, that is, which is not a part of another community, but 
has its own laws and its own council and its own magistrates . . . .”121 
Then, taking account of the reality of sixteenth century Europe and per-
haps especially of the manner in which the Spanish King, Holy Roman 
Emperor Charles V, held personal sovereignty over a vast but disparate 
array of states and lands, he added, that: “[T]here is no obstacle to many 
principalities and perfect States being under one prince. Such a [perfect] 
State, then, or the prince thereof, has authority to declare war, and no one 
else.”122 
Grotius, while starting from the same Augustinian proposition, and 
without explicitly rejecting Aquinas’ formulation of just war, proceeded 
to take a yet a different turn by making an additional distinction for those 
circumstances in which the prince is absent or negligent: 
In my opinion, however, when the prince is absent or negligent, and 
when no law exists expressly prohibiting this alternative course, the 
magistrate next in rank will undoubtedly have power not only to defend 
the state, but also to make war, to punish enemies, and even to put 
malefactors to death.123 
According to Grotius, the term “public war” is applicable in such 
cases, “[f]or such wars are supported by the will of the state; and the 
state’s will, whether expressly or tacitly indicated, ought assuredly to be 
regarded as authority for the waging of war . . . .”124 Applying theory to 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 169. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 64. 
 124. Id. It is important to remember, however, as Kingsbury has pointed out in refer-
ence to Peter Haggenmacher’s work, that: 
Grotius does not have a closely defined concept of “the state” in the senses sub-
sequently developed in western legal theory. Civitas, respublica, populus, 
regnum, and imperium are all used in JBP in ways that touch on the modern 
concept of “state,” but only “civitas” is defined, and Grotius does not employ a 
taxonomy that feeds into later analytic usages. 
Kingsbury, supra note 4, at 14. 
2006] THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 781 
facts, Grotius then concludes that “the state of Holland, even if it was 
subject to a prince, did not lack authority to undertake a public war inde-
pendently of that ruler . . . .”125 The State-Assembly of Holland, which 
according to Grotius, had since ancient times been the guardian of the 
people, had justly sought to defend the citizens of Holland against usur-
pation of their rights by the Duke of Alba and the Spanish King. When 
the deposed King had sought to regain his lost sovereign status by force 
of arms, he had given the Dutch just cause for war.126 Grotius’ argument 
was not intended as a theory of a right of rebellion held by the people 
against a legitimate sovereign. On the contrary, in Grotius’ view there 
had been no rebellion. According to Grotius, the “prince,” Philip II, 
Count of Holland and King of Spain, was not in Holland an absolute 
monarch holding all the “marks” or “powers” of sovereignty.127 The 
power to tax, for instance, was concurrently held by the prince and the 
state assembly. When the prince had attempted to bypass the state as-
sembly and authorize new taxes without seeking that body’s approval, it 
was an attempted usurpation of the “mark” of sovereignty retained in this 
body, whose duty it then was to defend itself against the prince. “He who 
holds some mark of sovereignty has the right to wage war in defence of 
that mark [of sovereignty], even [if this be conducted] against a party 
which holds another mark.”128 Grotius’ view of disaggregated sover-
eignty was thus composed of a double assertion: First, the “marks” or 
“powers” of sovereignty were not necessarily always held in a single 
“prince,”129 and second, every holder of a “mark” of sovereignty was 
privileged to engage in public war in defense of its own mark. Further-
more, as we have seen, Grotius maintained that in the absence of the 
sovereign, or when the sovereign was negligent, the magistrates could 
wield sovereign powers and, if necessary, declare public war. The net 
result was to significantly open up the category of those whose authority 
was sufficient to wage just war.130 
While these technical arguments were perhaps sufficient to counter the 
charge that the conflict with Spain was a war of rebellion, the question 
remained, whether the United Provinces could be considered a state at 
all. It was not just that the United Provinces boasted a bewildering array 
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of competing or concurrent sovereignties which co-existed in uneasy 
harmony held together only by a common external threat. The United 
Provinces also suffered from border indeterminacy. The Dutch had 
sought to push back the sea, and in that arena they had enjoyed signifi-
cant successes; yet, their political boundaries shifted daily with the vaga-
ries of the successes and failures of war. Many of the provinces and cit-
ies, which had signed the treaty of the Union of Utrecht in 1579 and 
those that had abjured the sovereignty of Philip II in 1581, were in the 
early seventeenth century back under Spanish control. Furthermore, the 
Dutch did not share a strong sense of national identity. The population 
was far from being homogeneous: Their numbers since the break with 
Spain had swollen through immigration, mostly from the southern Haps-
burg controlled provinces, but also from England, France, Spain and Por-
tugal. The Dutch army reflected and magnified this diversity as it was 
composed of large numbers of foreigners, including whole battalions 
under foreign command. The people of the United Provinces spoke dif-
ferent languages and worshipped in different sects. Their economic inter-
ests split along the cleavage that separated the maritime from the interior 
provinces. The Province of Holland, a behemoth among equals, domi-
nated the union economically and politically and was not trusted by the 
other provinces. Moreover, if it was unclear what or who the United 
Provinces were, there was even less consensus about what or who they 
should become. At the most basic level, for instance, at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, there was no accord on whether the future of the 
United Provinces should encompass the southern provinces still under 
Spanish rule. 
At the time of the taking of the Santa Catarina, the United Provinces 
was a polity in search of a national identity. In response to anxiety about 
its character as a true nation, the people of the United Provinces adopted 
a variety of strategies. Among these, the Batavian myth, the claim that 
the Dutch were descended from a noble Germanic tribe that had valiantly 
resisted the Roman conquerors and been much admired by them, gave 
the new polity an ancient pedigree;131 self-identification as the new Israel 
gave it a spiritual ideology and divine recognition;132 and the tales of 
Spanish cruelty and enmity, depicted in art, performed on stage, and re-
counted in the popular literature and pamphlet press, served to unite them 
                                                                                                             
 131. SCHAMA, supra note 20, at 75. Indeed, Grotius contributed to the elaboration of 
the myth in his history of the ancient Batavians, Liber de Antiquitate Republicae Batavi-
corum (1610). 
 132. Id. at 93. 
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against a common oppressor.133 All three of these strategies are brought 
to bear by Grotius in De Iure Praedae.134 In building the implicit case for 
a Dutch nation at the front of the state, however, Grotius incorporates a 
number of additional elements which all work toward the goal of giving 
the fact of the nation an incontrovertible feel of reality. First of these is 
the association Grotius makes between Dutch geography, Dutch charac-
ter, and Dutch destiny.135 When Grotius refers to the character of the 
people and its connection to the geographic reality of the nation, its re-
sources and physical character, he is building the image of a natural en-
tity; the people of Holland have become the maritime nation of the 
United Provinces. The United Provinces, in this telling, is bounded by 
water, its character is set by water, and its relationship to the rest of the 
world is determined by this characteristic. Its productiveness and indus-
try are the result of geography. Thus, nature herself had compelled the 
Dutch to their maritime destiny; commerce was not simply a chosen ac-
tivity but their vocation. It is thus possible for Grotius to approach this 
entity (bounded by the sea, inhabited by merchants) as an economic unit, 
with its own unique interior economic reality (needs, resources, skills), 
and this economic character sets it apart from and separates it out from 
other “natural” groups. 
If Dutch geography, character and destiny had made merchants of 
them, then the state could be properly imagined as a political community 
of merchants, and the merchants’ interests became the state’s interests. 
As we have seen, Grotius describes the survival of the United Provinces 
as bound up with Dutch commercial expansion into the East Indies. 
Commerce in the United Provinces was a matter of nationwide concern, 
for, according to Grotius, even the mass of the common people had an 
economic stake in it. In Grotius’ account, commerce had become a major 
                                                                                                             
 133. See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 23. 
 134. See, e.g., 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1, 168, 338. 
 135. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 171. In the seventeenth century, similar claims con-
cerning English geography, character, and destiny would begin to be made. In the case of 
England (Britain) the insular nature of the nation gave it its character and led to its des-
tiny as a seaborne empire. As Armitage argues in The Ideological Origins of the British 
Empire, one significant advantage of the distinctive seaborne quality of the destiny of the 
English (then British) was that a seaborne empire could be associated with liberty and 
commerce, and distinguished from the conquest and tyranny of the land-based empires of 
antiquity and of Spain. ARMITAGE, supra note 31, at 100–01. Obviously this distinction 
also served the Dutch, who prided themselves on being purveyors of liberty along with 
commerce. Id. at 166. 
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matter of public concern, a national concern, as important, if not more 
important, than war. Consequently, one of the protean state’s core func-
tions had become to take responsibility for securing commerce and for 
facilitating the expansion of trading opportunities on behalf of the “na-
tion.”136 
A further indication of the degree to which Dutch character, Dutch 
commercial interest, the nature of the Dutch polity, and her future had 
become intertwined can be found in Grotius’ remarks in De Iure Prae-
dae, approving the States-General of the United Provinces for their pre-
science and solicitude in first seeking to consolidate and then granting a 
“federal” charter (and a twenty-one year monopoly) to the VOC, a corpo-
rate conglomerate that united under one umbrella the many disparate and 
previously locally chartered East India Companies.137 The ostensible 
purpose of the federal incorporation of the VOC had been to avoid dupli-
cation and reduce wasteful, self-defeating internal competition. The 
Dutch nation as a whole would suffer if the privately owned companies 
of each province vied with each other for the same pepper crop, inflating 
the price of pepper in the East Indies, or if they glutted the Asian market 
with European goods. In response to this inefficient competition fraught 
with the dangers of inter-company and inter-provincial conflict, the 
States-General had recognized the need for “federal” regulation of com-
merce.138 Under the aegis of the VOC, the companies would now be re-
quired to coordinate their activities, and while they might sail on behalf 
of one of the local companies, at least in the East Indies they could pre-
sent themselves as Dutch merchants, members of a distinctive national 
community and citizens of a sovereign state. Paradoxically, the idea of a 
Dutch nation was being forged in the open seas, in regions far distant 
                                                                                                             
 136. The idea that commerce was a central or crucial matter of state interest became 
prevalent in the late seventeenth century, but it was not so in the early part of the century. 
While merchants may very well have made such claims in an earlier period, it was not 
generally so understood until much later. 
 137. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 341. For the text of the VOC Charter, see The Licence 
Granted by the States General to the Dutch East India Company on March 20, 1602, in 
VOC 1602–2002: 400 YEARS OF COMPANY LAW 29, 29–38 (Ella Gepken-Jager et al. eds., 
2005). 
 138. The VOC Charter stated: 
We, the States General, have made due reflection after thoroughly considering 
the importance to the United Netherlands and its good inhabitants that this 
same shipping trade and commerce [to the East Indies] be maintained and al-
lowed to expand by means of an appropriate general regulation of its policy, 
mutual relations and its administration. 
Id. at 29. 
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from any claim to territory, borders, population or self-government, by 
traders who were employees of a corporation. 
Moreover, with “federal” incorporation of the VOC came nationwide 
ownership of shares. The ambition that the company be truly representa-
tive of the nation and its interests and that all citizens become stake-
holders (or, from our perspective, the goal that the VOC help give shape 
to a nation), was incorporated into the very design of the VOC. A strik-
ing term of the charter provided that: “All of the inhabitants of these 
United Netherlands shall be allowed to be shareholders in this Company 
and to do so with as small or as great an amount as they see fit.”139 Nor 
were these merely empty words, for its purpose was given effect by a 
further proviso that if too much capital was offered, then those who had 
invested an amount greater than 30,000 guilders would be required to 
“decrease this capital pro rata in order to make place for others.”140 Fur-
thermore, the charter made provision for adequate publicity: “In the 
months that follow, the inhabitants of this land shall be kept informed of 
developments by means of public posters pasted in those places where 
they are usually pasted.”141 Following its incorporation, the VOC was 
immensely successful in raising the necessary start-up capital. Initial 
shares were acquired by all sectors of society, including villages, charita-
ble associations and relatively humble tradespeople, although soon 
enough, those least able to afford to hold risky and long-term invest-
ments sold-up and left corporation ownership in the hands of a narrower 
set of more traditional and wealthier owners.142 Nonetheless, stake-
holders in the VOC included not only individual private investors, but 
the whole range of public authorities who shared sovereignty across the 
United Provinces: City governments, provincial governments, the States-
General, and the Statholder all held shares in the company. Along with 
economic stake came a voice in corporate governance, for, the VOC’s 
corporate structure, as described in the charter of 1602, mirrored and 
gave concrete form to the complex, weighted, multi-sovereign, decentral-
ized political system that had developed ad hoc in the United Prov-
inces.143 Moreover, in its insistence on a nationwide unity of interest, in 
its attention to the joint commercial and political interests of the com-
pany that now represented a nation, the charter of the VOC also reflected 
the centralizing aspirations of the States-General of the United Provinces. 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. 
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 142. Claudia Schurmann, The VOC, the WIC, and Dutch Methods of Globalization in 
the Seventeenth Century, 17 RENAISSANCE STUD. 474, 478 (2003). 
 143. See id. at 29–38. 
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The fact that a private commercial corporation such as the VOC could 
serve as template for and representative of the Dutch “nation in forma-
tion” in 1602, may help explain Grotius’ second departure from Aquinas’ 
formulation of just war theory—the significant introduction of the cate-
gory of just “private” war. As we have seen, Aquinas did not recognize 
the possibility of just “private war.” For Aquinas, war was by definition a 
matter of public authority—commanded by a sovereign and waged in 
pursuance of a just cause which Aquinas had specified meant that “those 
who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account 
of some fault.”144 Conceptually, such wars concerned the public function 
of correction or punishment. For Aquinas, private strife was always sin-
ful, for private persons always had recourse to public authorities in case 
of injury. Vitoria had restated Aquinas’ principle as: “There is a single 
and only just cause for commencing a war, namely, a wrong received.”145 
Unlike Aquinas, however, Vitoria had recognized a limited role for “pri-
vate war.” According to Vitoria, anyone could wage a private war in de-
fense of his person, property or goods. A private person, however, had no 
right to avenge wrongs done him. Furthermore, self-defense could only 
be resorted to in a moment of danger. Once the necessity had passed, the 
legitimacy of private war was at an end.146 
Grotius went much further in legitimizing private war. As we saw ear-
lier, in De Iure Praedae, Grotius had gone back to first principles and 
mapped out a comprehensive theory of justice in order to produce a sys-
tematic law of war.147 At the conclusion of the Prolegomena, summariz-
                                                                                                             
 144. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 34, pt. 2, question 40, art. 1. 
 145. VITORIA, supra note 8, at 170. 
 146. According to Vitoria: 
Any one, even a private person, can accept and wage a defensive war. This is 
shown by the fact that force may be repelled by force . . . . Hence any one can 
make this kind of war, without authority from any one else, for the defense not 
only of his person, but also of his property and goods. 
Id. at 167. Furthermore, 
[B]e it noted that the difference herein between a private person and a State is 
that a private person is entitled, as said above, to defend himself and what be-
longs to him, but has no right to avenge a wrong done to him, nay, not even to 
recapt property that has been seized from him if time has been allowed to go by 
since the seizure. But defense can only be resorted to at the very moment of the 
danger, or, as the jurists say, in continenti, and so when the necessity of defense 
has passed there is an end to the lawfulness of war. 
Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 71–87. 
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ing his position on just war, Grotius makes it clear that in his view just 
war might be public or private: 
A war is said to be ‘just’ if it consists in the execution of a right, and 
‘unjust’ if it consists in the execution of an injury. It is called ‘public’ 
when waged by the will of the state, and in the latter concept the will of 
magistrates (e.g. princes) is included. . . . Those which are waged oth-
erwise . . . are ‘private’ wars, although some authorities have preferred 
to describe such conflicts as ‘quarrels’ rather than ‘wars’. . . . In the 
present work, the terms ‘seizure of prize’, ‘seizure of booty’, are used 
to refer to the acquisition of enemy property through war [whether pub-
lic or private].148 
In Grotius’ system, the natural rights of states are derived by analogy 
from the natural rights of private individuals living in a world society, a 
sort of “state of nature” that existed historically prior to the creation of 
civil society. The state is an artificial creation that cannot, in Grotius’ 
view, receive any right that did not first belong to the individual. And 
this, as we will see, includes the right to punish and correct, and even to 
avenge injuries—that is, to wage just war—under the right circum-
stances. 
Much of De Iure Praedae is taken up with Grotius’ revision and appli-
cation of just war theory.149 As his analysis unfolds, Grotius covers all 
the bases. First, he examines the facts from the perspective of “private 
war” and poses the question of whether the VOC, viewed strictly as a 
private person, would have been justified in waging private war. Then, 
he looks at the facts and considers the case from the perspective of “pub-
lic” war, arguing that the VOC ship was engaged in a “public war” on 
behalf of the sovereign. These two series of arguments, one from the per-
spective of private war and the other from the perspective of public war 
are presented by Grotius as arguments in the alternative. In each context, 
he maps out a series of competing and overlapping claims about the Por-
tuguese injury or offense that could have been sufficient to supply cause 
                                                                                                             
 148. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 149. About a quarter of the text of De Iure Praedae (chapters III–X) is devoted to fur-
ther theoretical analysis of the many questions underlying just war: Whether war can ever 
be just; whether just war can be waged against Christians; who can wage it; for what 
cause(s); whether the nature of the cause(s) is different in the case of public or private 
war; who can take prize; what (and how much) may be taken as prize; who may be le-
gitimately despoiled; and who gets to keep the spoils. Id. at 31–167. These issues are 
taken up again and given further nuance in chapters XII–XIII, in which Grotius applies 
his theory of just war to the facts. Id. at 216–317. Their contours are again revisited in 
chapters XIV and XV in the course of a discussion of whether the taking of the Santa 
Catarina was honorable and beneficial in addition to being legitimate. Id. at 318–66. 
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for just war. Each approach, each formulation of the facts, leads him to 
the same conclusion. Whether he approaches it from the perspective of 
the Dutch commander Van Heemskerck, the VOC, the United Provinces, 
the East Asian “allies” or the world community, the conditions of just 
war doctrine are met and the taking of the Santa Catarina is determined 
to have been a legitimate action taken in the course of “just” war.  
I do not propose to review the twists and turns of Grotius’ analysis in 
detail. Rather, I wish to focus on some consequences arising out of his 
categorical embrace of just “private” war. The intuition that underlies my 
analysis is that Grotius’ decision to provide theoretical sanction to just 
“private” war in the face of the tradition’s disfavor can be traced back to 
his central preoccupation with commerce (including his awareness that 
Dutch national identity had come to be conjoined with commerce) and to 
the sovereign anxiety that he labored under. 
One of the most interesting consequences of Grotius’ decision to en-
dorse the possibility of just private war is that it inspired him to defend a 
doctrine of the freedom of the seas. In De Iure Praedae we can observe 
this doctrine serving two distinct functions: First, it served to support the 
claim that in blockading the sea the Portuguese were inflicting an injury, 
an injury that could in turn serve to justify either “private” or “public” 
just war in defense of the right to trade. Second, it provided the grounds 
for the exceptional case of necessity that justified van Heemskerck’s 
prosecution of a private war against the Portuguese. For, while Grotius 
was willing to entertain the possibility of just private war, he was not 
ready to make the benefits of just war doctrine available indiscriminately 
to all private persons seeking to avenge an injury. His solution was to 
circumscribe the doctrine by limiting its availability to those situations 
where private individuals were in effect returned to the pre-civil law 
natural state. 
According to Grotius, “[i]n the natural order . . . every individual is 
charged with the execution of his own rights.”150 Since “just war consists 
in the execution of a right,”151 it would seem that individuals in the natu-
ral order were privileged to engage in just private war. Nonetheless, 
Grotius recognized that when individuals had entered into civil society, 
the state became the arbiter of disputes that concerned them. The fear 
was that an excess of self-love might corrupt the ability of the individual 
to be judge and executor in his own cause. Thus, private individuals were 
required under civil law to submit their causes to civil tribunals. The civil 
law, created to support and help enforce the natural order had, however, 
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merely displaced but not extinguished the natural rights of individuals. 
Thus, in the exceptional case of “necessity,” when judicial means for the 
attainment of his rights proved defective, the individual was in Grotius’ 
view still privileged to execute his own rights. “[I]n so far as a defect 
exists, to that extent recourse to force—or, in other words, private execu-
tion in accordance with the natural order—is just.”152 According to 
Grotius, two kinds of necessity could be recognized: temporary neces-
sity, as in the case where a person is being attacked and must defend his 
person or his property because his rights are about to be violated—in 
which case, necessity and therefore the justice of private war cease the 
moment when recourse to an adjudicator becomes possible; and continu-
ous necessity, which may be due to a defect in law or fact.153 A continu-
ous “defect in fact” occurs “whenever the person to whom jurisdiction 
properly pertains, is disregarded by those subject to him.”154 For our pur-
poses, however, the “defect in law” is the more interesting category. “It 
is a defect in law,” says Grotius, “when in a given place there is no one 
possessing jurisdiction, a state of affairs which may exist in dessert 
lands, on islands, on the ocean or in any region where the people have no 
government.”155 Grotius reiterates: 
In such cases . . . the situation becomes very much what it was before 
states and courts of justice were established. But in those days human 
beings were governed in their mutual relations solely by the six laws 
which we laid down first of all. Those six precepts were the source of 
all law, and also of the principle that each individual was the executor 
of his own right . . . .156 
Thus, we find that in Grotius’ opinion, the ocean is a space outside of 
civil jurisdiction; a space where a “defect in law” and so “necessity” ex-
ists in a permanent form. In such a space, individuals are returned to their 
original state before civil law and are freed to become judges and execu-
tors in their own case, or, in other words, to engage in just private war in 
response to an injury. 
That the ocean is a place empty of jurisdiction (and so permanently 
available for private war), is a conclusion that Grotius arrives at in the 
context of reviewing the legitimacy of possible Portuguese claims justi-
fying their “demand . . . that noone save themselves shall approach the 
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East Indies for purposes of trade.”157 Grotius proceeds step by step. He 
begins by demonstrating that the Portuguese can have no claim to owner-
ship of the regions visited by the Dutch in the East Indies. These lands, 
argues Grotius, were clearly the property of the East Indian peoples and 
their sovereigns before the advent of the Portuguese. Grotius then re-
views possible Portuguese claims to ownership from actual possession or 
title to possession (from discovery, papal donation, or just war) and dis-
misses each in turn. Having satisfactorily demonstrated that the Portu-
guese had “not acquired any legal right over the East Indian peoples, 
lands or governments,” Grotius turns his attention to the question of 
whether they had nonetheless brought “the sea and matters of navigation, 
or the conduct of trade, under their own jurisdiction.”158 It is at this point 
in his analysis that Grotius develops his doctrine of the “freedom of the 
seas,” a doctrine that is at root a theory of property. 
The basic argument runs as follows: In the beginning there was no pri-
vate ownership but all things were held in common.159 Through a gradual 
process, moveable goods that could be consumed (or whose usefulness 
was reduced by prior use) and those immoveable goods which were not 
sufficient for indiscriminate use by all persons came to be apportioned 
through the physical act of attachment. So was born the institution of 
private property (and the law to govern it). Since the origin of private 
property lay in the removal of goods from “common property” for exclu-
sive use through an act of physical attachment, “occupation” came to be 
recognized as the root of title for private property. It was, according to 
Grotius, in this same period of time that the establishment of states was 
first undertaken. “Accordingly . . . those things which were wrested from 
the original domain of common ownership have been divided into . . . 
public property . . . owned by the people . . . [and] strictly private prop-
erty . . . belong[ing] to individuals.”160 The sea cannot, by its nature, be 
occupied—it cannot be bounded or enclosed. Furthermore, adds Grotius, 
even if it could be enclosed, there is no reason to seek to apportion the 
sea, for it can be used by all equally without diminishing its usefulness. 
Those things which are “capable of serving the convenience of a given 
person without detriment to the interests of any other person . . .” should 
remain free to all, for “they proceeded originally from nature and have 
not yet been placed under the ownership of anyone . . . [and] it is evident 
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 159. By “common ownership,” Grotius does not mean to imply joint ownership or 
community ownership which is a kind of private property. Rather, he means to denote a 
form of ownership that existed prior to the creation of private property. 
 160. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 230. 
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. . . that nature produced them for our common use.”161 The sea, argues 
Grotius, “is an element common to all, since it is so vast that no one 
could possibly take possession of it, and since it is fitted for use by all, 
‘with reference to purposes of navigation and to purposes of fishing, as 
well.’”162 Thus, he concludes: “[T]he sea is included among those things 
which are not articles of commerce, that is to say, the things that cannot 
become part of anyone’s private domain.”163 In other words, according to 
Grotius, the sea had remained in the original state of nature in which all 
things had been held in common. Nothing that the Portuguese could do 
would change that. The oceans remained under common ownership and 
thus could never come under any state’s jurisdiction, save in the limited 
case of an agreement between states, but such an agreement would, as 
positive law, be binding only on the contracting states. 
As mentioned above, for Grotius one of the implications of finding that 
the ocean was a space by its very nature free of private ownership and 
thus not subject to any state jurisdiction, was that it became a space 
where “private” war could be legitimate. For when they were on the sea, 
private individuals were by definition in a situation where judicial re-
course was lacking in a continuous manner, and so, in a state of perma-
nent “necessity” if they suffered an injury. On the sea, in a sense, private 
individuals reverted back to the state of nature and, as Grotius had said, 
“In the natural order . . . every individual is charged with the execution 
of his own rights.”164 As private “individuals” engaged in private war, 
the Dutch merchant vessels could now rely on a double line of reasoning 
to justify their “just war” taking of the Santa Catarina. First, they could 
make the claim of just defense against an unjust war begun by the Portu-
guese, for as Grotius had pointed out: “[T]hose same causes which ren-
der war just for the aggressor when they themselves are just, transfer this 
quality to the party defending itself if that justice is wrongfully claimed 
for them.”165 Since Grotius had demonstrated that the Portuguese had no 
lawful basis for a claim to ownership or jurisdiction over the sea, one 
could take the view that the Portuguese blockade was itself an act of war, 
and conclude that the Dutch vessel’s defensive action was by the opera-
tion of reversal, automatically just. Second, either the Dutch vessel or the 
VOC could claim that in attacking the Portuguese carrack, they had 
merely been engaged in the execution of their own rights, for the Portu-
guese had (at a minimum) interfered with their right to free navigation 
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and with their right to engage in trade, both of which were universal and 
natural rights. The four recognized just causes of war, which originated 
in the most fundamental natural law principles, were self-defense, de-
fense of one’s property, recovery of debts arising out of contracts, and 
the punishment of wrongdoing or injury.166 In attacking the carrack, the 
Dutch merchants had sought to defend their property, for in Grotius’ 
view, property included the right to trade. 
The defence or recovery of possessions, and the exaction of a debt or of 
penalties due, all constitute just causes of war. Under the head of ‘pos-
sessions’, even rights should be included. . . . But the concept of 
‘rights’ embraces both that which is due us in our capacity as private 
individuals, and that which is our due by the law of human fellowship   
. . . that is to say, the use of whatever is common—e.g. the sea and 
commercial opportunities—forms a part of the said concept. Therefore, 
if any person has quasi-possession of such a right, it will be proper for 
him to defend that claim.167 
Furthermore, private individuals, at least in a situation where there was 
“no judicial recourse” (as was the case on the sea) were clearly endowed 
with the power to punish.168 The Portuguese attempt to blockade the sea 
and prevent all other nations from engaging in mutually beneficial com-
merce was an offense not only against the Dutch merchants but against 
all of humanity. Thus, in attacking the carrack, the Dutch vessel had 
acted within its legitimate right to punish the offender on behalf of all of 
humanity.169 
                                                                                                             
 166. Thus, states Grotius, “insofar as concerns the persons who wage war . . . that war 
has a just cause, wherein the said persons defend their lives or their property, or seek to 
recover the latter, or attempt to exact either payment of that which is due or punishment 
for wrongdoing.” Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). 
 167. Id. at 262 (emphasis added). 
 168. According to Grotius: 
[J]ust as every right of the magistrate comes to him from the state, so has the 
same right come to the state from private individuals; and similarly, the power 
of the state is the result of collective agreement, as we demonstrated in our dis-
cussion of the Third Rule. Therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing 
that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by 
private persons before it was held by the state. 
Id. at 92. 
 169. What just end can be served by the private avenger? “[T]he private avenger has in 
view the good of the whole human race, just as he has when he slays a serpent . . . .” Id. 
at 93. 
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IV. PRIZE LAW—WAR AND EXCHANGE: ACQUIRING TITLE TO ENEMY 
PROPERTY 
The coercive seizing of enemy property in the course of war was a 
ubiquitous practice in the early seventeenth century. As with war itself, 
however, not all such seizures could be considered legitimate. The line of 
discrimination was that of “just war.” “[A]ll seizures of prize or booty 
are just, which result from a just war,”170 asserts Grotius, but “just war” 
did not simply provide a cleansing context within which coercive seizure 
became legitimate; rather the “cause” or “injury” that justified the war 
also turned seizure of enemy goods into a practical necessity. In Grotius’ 
terms: 
[I]n warfare—whether public or private—everything necessary for the 
execution of one’s right is permissible. It is indeed necessary, if we 
wish to obtain that which is our due, that we should acquire enemy 
property [rem hostilem]; and the acquisition of such property is nothing 
more nor less than that very practice which we call ‘acquisition of prize 
or booty’ . . . .171 
In Grotius’ rendition of just war doctrine, since an injury is a taking away 
of something that belongs to us, our seizure of prize is a response 
through which we are doing nothing other than attaining what is right-
fully ours. So intimate is the connection between just war and prize-
taking that Grotius can agree with those authorities who hold that “the 
essential characteristic of just wars consists above all in the fact that the 
things captured in such wars become the property of the captors.”172 
As might be expected given this line of reasoning, in De Iure Praedae, 
Grotius had little difficulty demonstrating that prize-taking in just war 
was a legitimate activity.173 Grotius’ central concern, however, was not 
with seizure per se, but with its operation within the ambit of property 
relations. Grotius acknowledged that war, like commerce, functioned as a 
means of exchange: goods in war clearly changed hands. Ever attentive 
to important distinctions, however, Grotius recognized that there was a 
difference between possession and ownership. While the act of posses-
sion might be sufficient to create title in goods that had no prior owner, 
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the mere act of taking possession could not suffice to extinguish title in a 
previous owner. In the case of a voluntary exchange, the prior owner 
agreed to divest himself of title. When the act of exchange was involun-
tary however, something more was needed. For Grotius, this something 
more was “never lacking” in the case of just war, for the law of prize 
operated to transfer title from the dispossessed enemy to the new 
owner.174 Prize law, in other words, served to “quiet title” and to return a 
good momentarily tainted by coercive dispossession into the stream of 
legitimate commerce. Indeed, so powerful is the urge to normalize the 
function of war as an exchange mechanism that Grotius will go so far as 
to claim that it is consensual, for, “wars carry with them a tacit agree-
ment of exchange, so to speak, an agreement to the effect that each bel-
ligerent, acquiescing in the turn of the die as the contest proceeds, shall 
take the other’s property or lose his own . . . .”175 War, in this image, is a 
game of chance, a game which participants enter willingly in full knowl-
edge that they are engaged in a process of exchange in the course of 
which they might gain property or lose it. 
That Grotius should approach prize law as a subset of property law 
makes perfect sense once we remember the starting point of De Iure 
Praedae. The specific legal controversy that Grotius sets out to address is 
whether the taking of the Santa Catarina was legitimate. But the anxiety 
behind this question is not about legitimate or illegitimate violence. In-
deed, throughout the text the question of violence recedes into the back-
ground. The incident at the heart of the story, the taking of the Santa Ca-
tarina, is passed over without description. The reader is given no details 
of the confrontation between the “enemy” vessels. We are told nothing of 
the excitement of battle, there is no mention of the firing of cannon, no 
mention of casualties, indeed no mention of the violence necessary to 
subdue and board a large Portuguese carrack, nor of the violence inherent 
in the coercive seizure of the personal property of passengers, men, 
women and children, along with the trade goods carried in the hold of the 
vessel. Rather, the anxiety that Grotius sets out to assuage is that of the 
“legitimacy” of the goods themselves. As is clear from the introductory 
chapter of De Iure Praedae, there was some concern among Dutch mer-
chants that the goods seized from the Santa Catarina might be tainted.176 
The more serious concern, however, was that the prior owners might still 
have some claim of title over the goods of which they had been dispos-
sessed and such doubts could reduce the value of the goods in the market 
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place. Consequently Grotius’ task was to overcome such hesitations by 
demonstrating that, whatever view one took of the incident, whether it 
was a case of private war or public war, title to the goods had passed. 
The previous owners had been well and truly dispossessed by the opera-
tion of the laws of war and prize, and the goods were now indistinguish-
able from any other goods in the market. 
It is this same concern with “quieting title” that accounts for another 
notable characteristic of Grotius’ approach to prize law: the expansive 
view he adopts of what and how much can be taken as prize and from 
whom it can be seized. In theory, Grotius respects the idea of what we 
today would call the principle of proportionality. In pursuit of just war, a 
belligerent should seek only to recover his due. Thus, at least in theory, 
the limiting factor is the nature or quantum of the injury. By definition an 
injured party is entitled to seize booty or prize from the enemy up to the 
full amount of the debt owed. As it is applied by Grotius, however, the 
doctrine could be interpreted as imposing no limit whatsoever. Whether 
he approached the question from the perspective of just war or from that 
of public war, Grotius deemed injuries offenses against rights, making it 
hard to quantify the harm, especially when the right has a universal, as 
well as a personal dimension. For instance, as we have seen in the case of 
commander Van Heemskerck and the VOC, Portuguese interference with 
the Dutch right to engage in commerce could be viewed as an offense not 
only against Dutch merchants, but against the East Indian peoples or 
against the whole world. Thus, the size of the Portuguese “debt” was not 
solely determined by the loss in profits that the Portuguese blockade had 
caused the VOC, though that was, according to Grotius, already “truly 
enormous.” The Portuguese liability extended to the debt incurred for the 
illicit seizure of a right pertaining to all of humanity in the natural order. 
Furthermore, if this argument should prove insufficient, there was, in 
Grotius’ assessment of the facts, no end to the number and variety of 
Portuguese offenses against the Dutch nation, which could be attributed 
to individual Portuguese or to the Portuguese nation, making a careful 
accounting of the “debt” superfluous—nothing could ever suffice.177 
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As to the matter of the parties from whom prize might legitimately be 
seized in just war, Grotius’ theory proved equally expansive—all enemy 
property was subject to seizure: “Therefore, we conclude that all [enemy] 
subjects, at all times, are liable to despoliation, but not necessarily to for-
feiture of their lives.”178 No one is excepted, not innocent subjects, not 
women and children and not merchants or farmers unless, of course, 
prior security against despoliation had been given.179 In De Iure Praedae 
Grotius develops a number of theories to support the view that all sub-
jects are liable for the “debts” of the state. First, he argues that individual 
citizens are bound by the act of the state and therefore liable for them. 
“Indeed,” he asserts, “it is in keeping with natural equity, since we derive 
advantages from civil society, that we should likewise suffer its disad-
vantages.”180 Second, drawing an analogy from the law of partnership, 
Grotius argues that individual subjects should be considered as severally 
liable for the debts of their state: 
The law of nations . . . does not recognize such distinctions [between 
groups and individuals]; it places public bodies and private companies 
in the same category. Now, it is generally agreed that private societies 
are subject to the rule that whatever is owed by the companies them-
selves may be exacted from their individual partners. . . . [T]he state is 
constituted by individuals . . . [and so] individuals are liable in the same 
fashion as the state in so far as concerns reparation for losses, even 
when the claim in question is founded on wrongdoing. . . . [P]ecuniary 
penalties owed by the state may be exacted from the subject, since there 
would be no state if there were no subjects.181 
Finally, Grotius challenges the notion that there might be such a crea-
ture as a truly innocent enemy subject. In Grotius’ view, even if the sub-
jects themselves could be considered as innocent of wrongdoing, their 
property was always necessarily implicated in the injury, for all enemy 
wealth served as a means of supporting the war effort: 
[Enemy] subjects, even when innocent, are liable to attack in war in so 
far as they impede the attainment of our rights; now, all subjects, even 
those who do not themselves serve as soldiers, impede our efforts by 
means of their resources, when they supply the revenue used in the 
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procurement of those things which imperil our lives and which do not 
only hinder the recovery of our possessions but also compel us to sub-
mit to fresh losses; and therefore, subjects must be deprived of such re-
sources . . . . Hence it is permissible to infer, not only that possessions 
may be forcibly taken from the said subjects, but also that these posses-
sions may be added to our own.182 
Enemy property has lost its innocence and become a weapon of war. 
“[A]ll enemy possessions are so many instruments prepared for our de-
struction; that is to say, through them weapons are provided, armies are 
maintained, the innocent are stricken down.”183 In a sense, Grotius’ ar-
gument amounts to the claim that in war, property loses its purely private 
character as it serves a public end. If the war is unjust then the property is 
subject to forfeiture automatically to pay the debt incurred by the state. 
From the just defendant’s perspective, all prize taken from enemy sub-
jects is legitimate since the debtor could never fully discharge his debt. 
No careful keeping of accounts was therefore required. In conformity 
with this expansive view of prize, a buyer seeking to purchase prize 
goods in the marketplace would be free to disregard any scruples con-
cerning the origin of the good. Prize goods that entered the marketplace 
were simply goods indistinguishable from other goods. But of course all 
this depended on the underlying assumption that the war in which the 
prize was taken was “just.” 
It is evident that a corollary to the claim that just war rendered prize 
goods legitimate is that an unjust war would render them illegitimate. 
Logical though this conclusion might be, it was not satisfying from a 
practical perspective. That the legitimacy of a good acquired through the 
seizure of prize should depend on the validity of a just war claim left 
goods in the marketplace vulnerable to an indeterminacy that could re-
duce their value. Whose responsibility would it be to determine whether 
the war was just? Could a buyer rely on a public pronouncement or was 
he responsible for considering the question for himself? Who after all 
could verify that a prize was taken with the right intention? Could it turn 
out after the fact that the claim of justice for the war was misplaced? 
Would the goods then have to be returned to the previous owner who had 
been wrongly despoiled? Grotius’ analysis of the law of prize sought to 
eliminate all such quandaries. 
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Grotius’ solution to the problem involved drawing a clear distinction 
between the sovereigns and their subjects. From the point of view of the 
sovereign (or the state), it was a logical impossibility that the war be just 
on both sides. In the case of belligerent states, only one could be engaged 
in a just war at any given moment. But, from the point of view of sub-
jects, the case was, according to Grotius, radically different. Subjects 
were not required to make a determination of the justice of the cause for 
themselves. Justice in subjects consisted in following the command of 
the sovereign. The only qualification was in those instances where reason 
rebelled against the command “after the probabilities have been 
weighed,” in which case the subject was freed from obedience to the 
sovereign.184 From the perspective of the subjects then, public war could 
be just on both sides, and if war was just on both sides, then “spoils are 
justly taken and retained by subjects on both sides.”185 Subjects who 
seize spoils from enemy subjects in public war are analogized by Grotius 
to “good faith possessors,” who cannot subsequently be dispossessed of 
their property. Troubled by the fact that at least insofar as irrevocable 
acquisition was concerned, his argument flew in the face of the natural 
law prohibition against the taking of private property, expressed within 
his theory of justice as the fourth precept,186 Grotius turned for assistance 
to the “secondary law of nations” which, as we have seen, in his scheme 
is mixed in origin.187 According to Grotius, all nations have agreed that 
things captured in war become the property of the captors of either bel-
ligerent party, regardless of the justice of their cause. The reason, adds 
Grotius, is pragmatic, for nations recognize that “citizens defend their 
state more zealously and bear the burdens of war more willingly under 
the influence of personal interest . . . .”188 Thus, invoking the secondary 
law of nations, Grotius concludes there is no duty to return spoils even if 
it turns out the public war was unjust; “For what I have once rightfully 
acquired cannot possibly cease to be mine, save by my own act.”189 
This line of reasoning, relying as it does on the secondary law of na-
tions, could not by definition apply to private war waged on the high 
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seas. On the high seas, as Grotius had earlier pointed out, private indi-
viduals found themselves outside the jurisdiction of any state, and were 
thereby returned to something like the state of nature, which existed prior 
to the formation of states, and so prior to the secondary law of nations, 
which was grounded in state agreement. On the high seas, private war 
was governed only by the law of nature including the prohibition against 
taking property already in the possession of another. What then of private 
war belligerents? Could their seizure of prize be subject to subsequent 
challenge? In the case of private war says Grotius, “war does not in itself 
suffice to [transfer title] . . . without the additional factor of a truly just 
cause.”190 It would thus appear that at least in the case of private war, the 
question of indeterminacy would re-emerge. Grotius’ response to this 
final quandary is eminently logical. He begins by returning to the distinc-
tion between temporary and continuous necessity. As we have seen, 
Grotius’ argument is that private war is legitimate only in the case of ne-
cessity when no recourse to judicial adjudication is available. In cases of 
temporary necessity, civil law is only in temporary abeyance, and since 
civil adjudication quickly becomes available, there is no automatic trans-
fer of title. In the case of continuous necessity, on the other hand, the 
situation is markedly different. In such cases, individuals, as if removed 
from civil society, revert back to their natural rights and are entitled to 
become judge and executor in their own cause. In other words, they are 
the sole judge of the justice of their cause and their decision is non-
reviewable. In such an instance, says Grotius, “one belligerent, acting for 
himself in the capacity of judge, acquires forthwith the goods seized as a 
pledge from the other belligerent. Nor will the former incur, at some later 
date when recourse to a judge becomes possible, any obligation to make 
restitution.”191 For, according to Grotius, that would be tantamount to 
reopening a case because of a change of facts after adjudication. Since 
the oceans are places outside civil jurisdiction, prize seized by private 
individuals pursuant to a claim of just private war, are permanently lost 
to their previous owners. 
One final concern, raised by Aquinas’ third condition defining just 
war, was quickly resolved. If just war required not only “just” cause but 
a “right intention,” what would happen when (as one might suspect was 
not infrequently the case) the primary motive for a given seizure of prize 
was the acquisition of enemy goods rather than the execution of one’s 
rights? Could such a distortion at the level of right intention affect the 
character of the goods seized? For Grotius the answer was unambiguous. 
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While “it is a vicious practice to aim at gain through spoils as one’s prin-
cipal goal . . .”192 says Grotius, it is nonetheless a matter of conscience 
not susceptible to proof and must therefore be disregarded. “Further-
more,” adds Grotius, “even in the court of conscience, he who wages war 
for an unjust purpose is indeed convicted of sin, but he rightfully retains 
the spoils.”193 The buyer of goods seized as prize in the seas of the East 
Indies could rest secure. 
Grotius’ interest in prize law as a mechanism of exchange had one fur-
ther ramification, which, while not immediately apparent in De Iure 
Praedae, is of central importance in the contemporaneous Commentarius 
in Theses XI. In this short treatise Grotius’ stated purpose is to provide a 
legal justification for the Dutch rebellion.194 As we might have expected, 
the topic naturally brings Grotius back to the subject of just war and the 
nature of sovereignty. As we saw him doing in De Iure Praedae, Grotius 
here rehearses the idea that sovereignty is not necessarily unified in a 
single absolute prince, but that to the contrary, “[t]he marks of sover-
eignty may be divided among several parties”195 as of course he contends 
they were in the case of the province of Holland. In the Commentarius, 
Grotius develops the theme of the marks of sovereignty in greater detail. 
Since each mark of sovereignty is self-contained, all marks of sover-
eignty are inherently equal. There can be no superior mark of sovereignty 
that trumps the others, for the definition of a mark requires that no one 
may rescind it by virtue of a higher right.196 Moreover, a mark of sover-
eignty is presented by Grotius as equivalent to a right; defensible within 
the framework of the just war doctrine. And each mark of sovereignty 
carries with it a natural right for its execution: 
Hence, there exists some natural right to exercise this mark . . . . And, 
since the mark [of sovereignty] is naturally linked to the means that 
tend towards the end of that mark, there is no natural reason why the 
right to apply these means should rest with another person than the one 
who has the mark [of sovereignty], just as each person has the natural 
right to defend himself.197 
From this proposition Grotius is able to conclude that: “He who holds 
some mark of sovereignty has the right to wage war in defence of that 
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mark [of sovereignty], even [if this be conducted] against a party which 
holds another mark.”198 
In line with this reasoning, the Dutch revolt could be characterized as a 
just war whereby the Dutch nation merely rose in defense of its mark of 
sovereignty seeking thereby to execute its right against the Spanish 
usurper. But the Dutch had not only defended their right, the United 
Provinces had sought to dispossess Philip II of his concurrent marks of 
sovereignty, to dispossess Philip and to acquire and retain those marks of 
sovereignty in themselves. In other words, Grotius still needed to identify 
a mechanism by which to justify the Dutch appropriation of Philip II’s 
marks of sovereignty, for the Dutch were not fighting an ongoing war 
against Spain to retain their ancient privileges, they were seeking to oust 
their prince. By what right could Philip be divested of his legitimate 
marks of sovereignty and by what mechanism could these rights be per-
manently acquired by the United Provinces? Once again, prize law came 
to the rescue. Grotius’ line of reasoning had placed the conflict waged 
between entities holding marks of sovereignty within the framework of 
just war. The Dutch, engaged in a just war to defend their mark of sover-
eignty against the usurper, were in the same posture as an individual 
waging private war on the seas or as a state engaged in public war 
against an enemy nation.199 The marks of sovereignty, treated conceptu-
ally as rights or property belonging to the usurping enemy, are simply 
seized by the defending party in the execution of their rights. By the op-
eration of prize law, “title” to the goods is then transferred automatically 
and is no longer subject to divestiture. Basing his argument on prize law, 
Grotius can then assert: “Whoever undertakes a just war in defence of a 
mark of sovereignty which lies within his competence also acquires the 
other marks.”200 
Despite the dramatic application of prize law that Grotius deploys in 
the Commentarius, his analysis of its function as a mechanism of ex-
change lacks some of the nuances it acquires in De Iure Praedae. For 
instance, in the Commentarius, Grotius appears to claim that the legal 
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“permanent acquisition” of goods in war is purely the result of the sec-
ondary law of nations,201 whereas in De Iure Praedae, Grotius turns to 
the secondary law of nations only to address the particular problem of 
goods taken in the course of a war that later turns out to be unjust.202 Be 
that as it may, the significance of Grotius’ use of prize law to justify 
Dutch “seizure” of sovereignty in the Commentarius is that it highlights 
its vital function in De Iure Praedae. That sovereignty itself might be 
one of the “goods” exchanged in war gives a different complex to 
Grotius’ otherwise somewhat puzzling insistence on presenting just war 
as a mechanism of exchange. That “title” to goods seized from the en-
emy should transfer in a permanent form was of greater consequence 
than might have first appeared. On the legitimacy of prize law hung not 
only the wealth of the United Provinces but her future as a sovereign na-
tion. The legitimacy of “property” rather than the legitimacy of violence 
had become the concern of the nascent international law of war. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Conventional views of international law have traditionally approached 
war and trade as categorically distinct forms of international relations. 
Consequently, it is assumed that public international law (including the 
law of war) and international trade law are distinct fields, each with its 
own separate history and trajectory. Furthermore, while war has come to 
be considered a great evil, trade is most commonly viewed as a good. 
Indeed, a broad range of theories from liberal internationalism to neo-
conservatism share the belief that the end of war will be achieved in part 
through the full liberalization of international trade, while international 
institutions such as the European Union are founded on the conviction 
that the scourge of war can be put to rest only through an institutionaliza-
tion of the liberal values of democracy and free markets. In any case, it is 
generally agreed that the goal of public international law should be to 
constrain war, while the goal of international trade law should be to en-
able international commerce. 
In this article, I have sought to challenge some conventional assump-
tions about the distinct trajectories of war and trade in the history of in-
ternational law by exposing the pervasive function played by commerce 
in Hugo Grotius’ early legal treatise De Iure Praedae (The Law of Prize 
and Booty).  In this important work, written by a major figure at the ori-
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gin of international law, war and international commerce have become 
indissolubly entwined. De Iure Praedae is an ambitious work in which 
Grotius maps out an original theory of justice, improvises a new doctrine 
of the freedom of the sea, and composes a first version of his influential 
theory of the law of war. Grotius’ innovations in each of these areas, my 
analysis suggests, can be understood as driven by the objective of pro-
ducing a new international law that recognizes international commerce as 
a critical concern of the European nations and is receptive and attentive 
to the private character of commercial activity overseas. The result is a 
theory of justice in which natural law seems particularly well-attuned to 
the character of virtuous commercial man, who serves the welfare of 
mankind as a corollary of pursuing his rightful profit. It is a doctrine of 
the freedom of the seas that supports a defensible right to engage in 
commerce (already implicit in the theory of justice) and, by claiming the 
seas as a space outside of state jurisdiction, provides the grounds for pri-
vate just war between merchants. And finally, the result is a more expan-
sive and permissive law of war, one which embraces the concept that 
interference with the right to engage in trade is an injury sufficient to 
justify just war; introduces the category of private war, a category for all 
intents and purposes specifically tailored to supply legitimacy to prize-
taking by merchant vessels; justifies treating all enemy goods as just 
prize; and redefines prize law as a mechanism of quieting title of enemy 
goods seized in war regardless of whether these were seized in the course 
of just or unjust war. 
The context of Grotius’ De Iure Praedae was the violent encounter of 
European merchants vying with one another for trading opportunities in 
the East Indies early in the seventeenth century. It was an encounter 
which, I argue, was generative of international law because it confronted 
legal theorists with a new form of conflict, one explicitly concerning 
commercial competition among members of “civilized” nations rather 
than the domination of “uncivilized” peoples, and one which manifested 
itself in the form of a violent confrontation between private merchants 
pursuing private economic interests in regions far distant from Europe. 
Nonetheless, the point is not simply to argue that international law’s tra-
jectory served the interests of trade from its earliest inception, though 
this is made abundantly clear in my reading of Grotius’ De Iure Praedae. 
Instead, what I have hoped to show through the detailed reading of 
Grotius’ text is that commerce inhabits every inflection of the text and 
that, in the end, commerce serves the interest of war as much as war 
serves the interests of commerce. The function of commerce in Grotius’ 
text is not only economic. Commerce is a way of thinking about the hu-
man being and God’s creation. It is inherent in the design of nature. 
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Commerce is the activity of private individuals, yet also a corporate prac-
tice. It becomes an expression of national identity and is presented as the 
nation’s vocation. The national interest, the nation’s well-being and even 
the nation’s liberty are imagined as dependent on the success of com-
merce as much as they are on war. To defend the right of commerce is 
not only to defend the interest of private capital, but to defend the nation 
and to be on the side of nature and God’s plan. It becomes reasonable to 
argue that the sovereign should go to war in defense of commercial inter-
ests. Yet, the introduction of commerce as a valid justification for war 
requires a new way of thinking about the relationship between the sover-
eign and war, and between the sovereign and commerce, for commerce 
that must be defended is the domain of private individuals and corpora-
tions. Both commerce and war were transformed by the encounter of 
European merchants in the East Indies in the seventeenth century; com-
merce became more like war while war became more like commerce. 
Commerce served as a justification for war and was used as a weapon in 
war. War became a means of acquiring goods in the pursuit of com-
merce. 
Beyond showing that one cannot easily separate the history of interna-
tional law from the history of international trade, my reading of Grotius’ 
work offers a caution to those who have become convinced that the end 
to war can be achieved through trade liberalization. Grotius did not sim-
ply hold a positive view of commerce and do his utmost to transform 
international law to further the interests of commercial actors. The view 
of commerce that informs the whole work is a version of the “doctrine of 
the providential function of commerce.” According to this “doctrine,” 
international commerce is not merely divinely endorsed, but is actually 
brought into being by God’s will as part of God’s beneficent design to 
bring mankind back to harmony and friendship. In other words, Grotius 
adopted a view which is consistent with the popular idea that trade brings 
peace in its wake. Yet, despite his conviction, Grotius produced a series 
of legal doctrines that gave greater scope to war on behalf of trade. Fur-
thermore, he crafted legal arguments that made it possible to view war 
itself as a commercial activity. As the seventeenth century unfolded, con-
flict between European merchants in the East Indies escalated. Prize-
taking became a significant economic activity in the region. Eventually, 
of course, the East Indies also came under the scourge of colonization. 
Rather than harmony and friendship, commerce proved a vehicle of war 
and enmity. 
